


CRTA:

POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF CITIZENS OF SERBIA FALL 2022

Opinion poll



Political attitudes of citizens of Serbia – Fall 2022

The research aimed to gain insight into the Serbian citizens' attitudes concerning the main social and political topics, both domestic and international.

We examined ways of informing about socio-political topics, attitudes about democracy and current issues of domestic politics, attitudes about citizens' participation in activities at the local level, about voting in elections and the quality of the electoral process, attitudes towards the Kosovo dialogue, attitudes towards EU integrations, relations between Serbia and the EU and Russia, relations with other countries in the region, as well as the war in Ukraine and the position that Serbia should take.

In this report, the results of the current research are compared to the results of the CRTA's previous research:

- Post-election research, [May 2022](#) (*English*);
- Pre-election research, [February 2022](#);
- Research on participation in democratic processes, [November 2021](#) (*English*);
- Research on democracy and corruption, [April 2021](#); and
- Research on the democratic participation of citizens, [October 2020](#).

This report is an English translation of the [original report](#).

We are thankful to all the research participants, especially the interviewers and the Crta team, for their dedication and professionalism, as well as everyone who helped the Crta team with advice and suggestions in conceiving and conducting this research.

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Crta

Belgrade, 2022

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Summary

Sources of information

Citizens are still primarily informed about political and social issues **through television** (62%), followed by internet portals (40%). Out of the television channels, RTS is the most watched. When it comes to portals, blic.rs is the most visited. Half of those who use the services of **cable operators** watch television through service providers owned by Telekom Serbia (49%) and 37% through providers owned by SBB. The majority of citizens trust only the media with a pro-government editorial policy. More than half **trust only pro-government** television (56%), a fifth (18%) trust only critical ones, and 11% both. In the last year, there have been no major changes in trust in pro-government and critical media.

As many as four out of five citizens (80%) believe that the role of the **media in shaping political attitudes** is very or mostly important. Also, more than half of the citizens think that the media in Serbia is **under the significant political influence** (55%). When informed about political and social issues, the largest percentage of citizens (39%) respect and **consider experts trustworthy** - more than any other actors and sources of information.

Democracy

Opinions on democracy and autocracy are polarized. More than half of the citizens (54%) agree with the view that, regardless of all the difficulties, **democracy** is the best political system for Serbia, while slightly less than a half (45%) think that it is best for Serbia at the moment to have a **strong leader** whom everyone would obey, and when these data are cross-tabulated, a fifth of the citizens are for both. If they had to choose between these two systems, half of the citizens (50%) would **choose the democratic system**, while slightly less (41%) would choose the authoritarian one.

Citizens value the dimensions of democracy differently. They mainly identify democracy with free voting in elections, more than with the equality of election participants or the change of parties in power. The majority of citizens (91%) point out that it is important for democracy that citizens choose the government in **free elections**, that the government is regularly **held accountable by** the citizens and their organizations (84%), that **human rights** protect citizens from the arbitrariness of the state (83%), that the courts and parliament **control the work of the government** (82%) and that the state cannot **restrict to the minorities the rights** that the majority enjoys (81%). The views on the **equality of participants** in the democratic process (78%) and the need for a **periodic change of parties** in power have the lowest support (76%).

Most citizens (48%) support the **participatory model** of democracy, in which all citizens should always be actively involved in politics. 27% believe it is sufficient for citizens to engage in politics by voting in elections (representative model), while 24% choose the elite model, in which only politicians should deal with politics. Most citizens (43%) think that **non-governmental organizations protect the public interest** and fight for societal changes, while 28% assess their role negatively.

Domestic politics

A slightly larger portion of citizens thinks Serbia is moving in a wrong direction, which can be linked to the socio-economic problems that plague most of them. More citizens think Serbia is moving in the wrong direction (39%) than those who believe it is moving in the right direction (30%). Most citizens (43%) cite **socio-economic problems** as the most serious for them and their families: poor living standards and low income, problems with unemployment and working conditions, high prices, housing problems, poor situation, and lack of perspective of young people. However, 40% of citizens think their **quality of life does not depend** much on who is in power in Serbia.

Citizens are divided in assessing how the Government of Serbia managed the coronavirus pandemic. 40% are satisfied (and the same share is not satisfied). On the other hand, most citizens (50%) point out their satisfaction with how Serbia's healthcare system **dealt with the Covid-19 pandemic**. Slightly more than one-half of the citizens (57%) declare that they have been **vaccinated** against the coronavirus.

A substantial majority of citizens (71%) did not support the **holding of the EuroPride** in Belgrade. An even larger percentage (77%) believed this event was held **under pressure from the West**. On the other hand, one-third of citizens (34%) did not support "**family walks**," i.e., processions expressing opposition to the EuroPride. Most citizens (62%) would support the **introduction of mandatory military service** in Serbia.

Local community

Citizens evaluate the situation in the municipality where they live similarly to the one in the entire country. Most citizens (37%) think the **municipality is moving in the wrong direction**. Only 28% think that their quality of life depends on **who is in power** in the municipality. Citizens hardly ever follow **political events at the local level**. Only 18% follow them more intensively. Those who follow local events do so primarily through **local internet portals** (42%).

Most citizens do not see that someone in their community **works to solve the local problems**. More than a third of citizens (37%) state that the problems are being solved. Among them, every other points out that the **municipal, local self-government**

works on the problems, and one in three people says it is the **citizens themselves**. About a third of citizens, 36%, say that representatives of political organizations visited them in the past year.

Like in previous years, every fifth citizen (20%) **participated in actions or initiatives** in the local community, and those who were active primarily solved **communal problems**. Half of those who did not participate are not against such engagement in principle but say they **do not have time** or **do not know how**. Citizens single out communal and environmental issues as the areas they would engage in.

Only a quarter of citizens (23%) are familiar with some of the activities carried out by their **local community**, and every fifth (20%) participated in local community **council elections**. An even smaller share state that they participated in **local assemblies** (11%).

Elections

Three-quarters of citizens (74%) say that they **vote regularly**. Less than a third (31%) say they are closer to the parties in power, and 18% are closer to the **opposition parties**. Half (49%) do not incline to either, which is another stable finding. A small percentage of citizens (12%) point out that they are **members of political parties**.

Citizens are divided in their assessment of the April elections. Namely, 44% think the elections were free and fair, and 42% think they were not. Half of the citizens think that **there was vote rigging** on the Election Day, to a lesser or greater extent. The largest percentage of citizens (32%) said that the biggest problem for the elections in Serbia is that some political parties or candidates **pressured voters** to vote for them, while a slightly smaller share mentioned **misuse of public resources** (22%), followed by unequal **access to the media** and the inaccuracy of the **Voters' Register**.

Almost half, 46% of citizens, think that **opposition candidates were not sufficiently present in the media** during the election campaign, and 41% think they were. The vast majority of citizens, 79%, think that it is good for democracy that the **opposition is back in the National Assembly**, but the majority (71%) also stated that they did not follow the **broadcast of the sessions** of the National Assembly. Half of the citizens (48%) think that the **formation of the Government took a long time** because it was in the interest of the ruling party.

Kosovo

Citizens are divided in their **expectations of the development of the situation in Kosovo**. 39% think there will not be a dramatic deterioration in the coming months,

and 37% think there will be. Half of those who think there could be a worsening of the situation in Kosovo say that they are **worried** about it.

Most citizens, 70%, do not expect dialogue with Kosovo to lead to permanent stability and peace. Out of the proposed solutions, the only thing acceptable to the majority of citizens (62%) is that Serbia and Kosovo **continue the dialogue**, but not on the recognition of Kosovo, and without a time limit. It would be acceptable for 24% of citizens if Serbia regained Kosovo with the support of Russia and thereby exacerbated relations with the West, and for 21% if Serbia **gave up the dialogue** and froze the conflict with Kosovo, even though this would block Serbia's European integrations.

For 21% of citizens, the solution according to which Serbia and Kosovo **recognize each other within the existing borders** and become members of the EU is acceptable. The Franco-German proposal is unacceptable to the majority. The solution in which Serbia does not recognize Kosovo, but allows it to be a **member of international organizations**, has the least support. This proposal is acceptable for 17% of citizens. The proposed **exchange of territories**, in which the North of Kosovo would belong to Serbia, and a part of Preševo and Bujanovac to independent Kosovo, is supported by 16% of citizens.

When asked which international entity should be more **present in the dialogue**, most citizens say that it is Russia (29%), and for 17%, it is the EU, USA, or NATO

Citizens admit that they do not know enough about the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, but they think they would live better if there were a solution. They are skeptical of political interests in this dialogue and would like to be asked about possible solutions. The vast majority of citizens, 79%, think that the citizens of Serbia **do not know enough about the dialogue** with Kosovo and should be better informed, and 74% that the citizens of Serbia should confirm any agreement with Kosovo **in a referendum**. More than half of citizens (58%) think that rising tensions in Kosovo serve as an **excuse for politicians** not to solve pressing problems in Serbia, while almost as many (57%) think that reaching a permanent agreement with Kosovo would mean a **better future** for them and their families. Only about a third of citizens (32%) are ready to **set aside some of their income** to help protect Serbian interests in Kosovo.

Regarding the history of the conflict in Kosovo, almost two-thirds of citizens (65%) said that the conflict between Albanians and Serbs was **artificially created by politicians**, while a quarter (26%) believed that the conflict was inevitable. Nearly one-half of the citizens (46%) answered that **NATO won the war in 1999**, and 19% said that

FR Yugoslavia won. A substantial percentage of Serbian citizens (84%) **have not been to Kosovo** since 1999.

Foreign policy

When it comes to joining or leaving the EU path, a climate of indifference reigns, although there is a polarisation of attitudes regarding voting in the referendum to join the EU. Citizens would not want an alliance with Russia, let alone barter Kosovo for the EU. The majority of citizens, 36%, would be **indifferent to joining the European Union**, 28% would be happy, and 33% would be worried. An even higher percentage of citizens (43%) would be **indifferent to the termination of negotiations with the EU**. In a **potential referendum for joining the EU**, 42% would vote for joining and 45% against it. If there was a withdrawal from the EU, and the **formation of an alliance with Russia**, most citizens, 35%, would be worried. The majority of citizens, 64%, would be worried if Serbia became a **member of the EU with the recognition of Kosovo** as an independent state.

Most citizens favor maintaining military neutrality, thinking that more pressure on Serbia comes from the West to renounce Russia, than from Russia to abandon ties with the West. A large majority of citizens (71%) think that the **West is pressuring Serbia** to turn its back on Russia, while slightly more than a quarter of citizens (27%) think that **Russia is pressuring Serbia** to abandon European integration. The largest number of citizens, as many as 69%, believe that Serbia should **remain militarily neutral**, 19% that Serbia should form a military alliance with Russia, and only 9% favor a military alliance with Western countries.

More than a quarter of citizens (27%) have family members who **live, work, or study in EU countries** and only three percent in Russia.

Citizens support regional cooperation processes. They rate relations with Croatia and Albania as the worst and relations with Hungary and Macedonia as the best. Feelings over Montenegro are mixed. Nearly half of citizens (47%) disagree with the statement that Serbia is economically and militarily **the most powerful country in the region**, while almost a third (31%) think so. More than half of citizens (57%) support the **Open Balkans** initiative. Citizens rate Serbia's relations with **Hungary** by far most positively (76%), followed by **North Macedonia** (63%) and **Bosnia and Herzegovina** (46%). Citizens are divided about the relationship with Montenegro (30% bad, 30% good). When it comes to relations with Albania, 42% of citizens believe that they are bad. Relations between Serbia and **Croatia** were rated most negatively, 62% of citizens believe that relations with this country are bad.

The war in Ukraine

Although most citizens blame the West for the war in Ukraine and are closer to the Russian side of the war, there is a noticeable shift away from the Russian position in comparison to the first months of the war. Almost two-thirds of citizens (64%) think that the West (the United States, NATO, and the European Union) **is most responsible for the war in Ukraine**. More than half (58%) stated they were closer to the Russian position in the war, and about a fifth (22%) stated they were closer to the **Ukrainian side**. Most citizens think that Serbia should maintain good relations with Russia at the cost of withdrawing from the EU (61%), while a minor part (19%) believes that Serbia **should impose sanctions on Russia**.

Most Serbian citizens (80%) **follow the events in Ukraine**, mainly through **television** (60%), primarily by getting information through RTS and Happy TV. Those who get the most information about the events in Ukraine through Internet portals are fewer (20%), where N1, Nova, and Blic stand out, while 13% primarily use social networks, mainly Facebook.

There is growing concern about the consequences this war is having on Serbia. Almost everyone expects a further rise in prices, and most expect shortages of electricity and energy. Almost half of the citizens do not expect help from the West or Russia. Over half of the citizens (58%) believe that the war **seriously threatened the economy of Serbia**. A considerable percentage of citizens (93%) expect that during the upcoming winter in Serbia, the **prices** of food, electricity, and fuel will **escalate**, and more than half (65%) expect that there will be shortages of electricity and energy during the winter. Half of the citizens (48%) think that if there are shortages of electricity and other energy sources, **no one will help Serbia**.

Political context

Elections were held in Serbia on April 3, 2022, in which the ruling coalition of the Serbian Progressive Party and the Socialist Party of Serbia retained the majority in the National Assembly, while Aleksandar Vučić won his second presidential term. The elections took place in accordance with the laws in most polling stations but in a climate full of tensions. In the period before and after the Election Day, the ruling parties had a pronounced advantage over the opposition candidates, which was most evident in the uneven representation in the media.

The opposition parties that had boycotted the Assembly since 2019, and the 2020 elections, are again represented in the National Assembly. Their presence was noticed through the Assembly debates at the first sittings of the new convocation. The process of forming the Government took a long time. Prime Minister Ana Brnabić and members of the new Government took office only at the end of October. After the elections, the public discussed the possibility of early elections at the national and local levels.

For quite some time now, a fierce battle has been going on in the cable operators market, between Telekom Serbia, in public ownership, and the private company SBB. In the reporting of the media with a national frequency, the pro-government editorial policy is still expressed, while cable televisions have a more pronounced critical attitude towards political actors. The Council of the Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM) re-allocated national frequencies to Pink, Prva, B92, and Happy Television and announced a competition for the fifth frequency.

In Serbia, throughout 2022, there were occasional shortages in the market (dairy products, oil derivatives), and in addition to significant price increases, shortages and restrictions were announced for the upcoming winter. The environmental protests that were the focus of late 2021 and early 2022 continued, but more diffusely, in different parts of the country. The last Covid-19 wave peaked in August 2022 but was not as intense as the previous ones.

At the end of the summer, there was an intense debate about Belgrade hosting Europride, and the opponents of this event organized "family walks," i.e., religious processions. During the year, the pressure and verbal attacks of representatives of the authorities and tabloids on civil society and the media continued.

During 2022, there was no progress in the negotiations with the European Union nor the opening of new clusters. At the end of the summer, the situation in Kosovo

worsened, and tensions grew after the decision of the Pristina authorities to impose the use of Kosovo license plates. The citizens of Serbia learned about the Franco-German proposal for solving the Kosovo issue after parts of it were published in the Albanian media in September. Although the proposal was often mentioned in the following months, the public did not have the opportunity to get more informed.

In this period, regional cooperation intensified, especially in the form of the Open Balkans initiative. At the beginning of September, a wine fair was held in Belgrade, which Macedonian and Albanian officials visited. The relations with Croatia, which have been in crisis for years, further deteriorated, while relations with Hungary, which have been on an upward trajectory for years, improved even more markedly.

During September, Ukraine regained control over some of its territory after a counter-offensive on the eastern front. The European Union more explicitly asked Serbia to align itself with the EU's foreign policy as a candidate for membership. Serbia did not impose sanctions on Russia, but it voted for several resolutions condemning the invasion of Ukraine. Ministers Selaković and Lavrov met at the end of September.

The decision of the European Union on the supply of Russian oil, which would have consequences for Serbia, was postponed, but the question of supplying energy for the winter remained the focus of public interest. More and more Russian citizens are coming to Serbia, especially after the declaration of mobilization in Russia.

In the context of the war in Ukraine, television stations with national coverage reported in a robust pro-Russian tone. Happy television stood out, often directly broadcasting the propaganda of the Russian side through daily special shows in which local analysts interpreted and contextualized the events.

Methodology

Data collection method: Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI)

Target population: Adult residents of the Republic of Serbia (without Kosovo)

Type of sample: three-stage stratified random sample (territory of polling stations, household, respondents within the household), representative for the Republic of Serbia (without Kosovo)

Sample size: 1000 respondents

Margin of error: $\pm 3.16\%$ (95% confidence interval)

Strata: regions of Belgrade, Vojvodina, Šumadija, West, South, and East Serbia

Post-stratification: by sex, age, region, type of place of living, and level of education

Response rate: 38%

Average test duration: 31 minutes

Research duration: 11 days

Research period: September 24 – October 3, 2022

The CRTA independently conducted a *computer-assisted personal interviewing* (CAPI) for its own needs.

Previous research carried out by the CRTA was carried out via mobile phones (CATI). In comparing the results with previous research, the possible effect of changing the data collection method on the differences in the results (mode effect) should be considered.


The report presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample unless otherwise stated. When reading reports and graphs, one should keep in mind that percentages will not always add up to 100 due to rounding.

Detailed methodology and description of the sample are in the report's appendix.

1. Sources of information

In order to understand the context in which the attitudes of the surveyed citizens are formed, the report starts with how citizens are informed about socio-political topics and the kind of attitudes they have towards the media. Citizens are primarily informed about political and social issues through television and internet portals. Less than two-thirds are informed via television, while 40% follow internet portals. Compared to previous surveys, there is no change in the share of citizens who are informed through television (60% in May 2022).


What are your main sources of information on political and social issues?



Graph 1. Main sources of information

By far, the largest share of citizens who are primarily informed via television does so via RTS (41%), while Pink television is mentioned by half as many citizens (18%).


You said that one of the main sources of information about political and social issues that you use is television, please choose from this list the main television stations that you watch to get information.



Base: Those who follow political and social issues through television (62% of the total population)

Graph 2. Central television station for getting information


Citizens who mentioned informative online portals as the primary source of information on political and social topics chose the leading internet portal through which they got information from the offered list. Unlike television, the relationship between the most frequently followed portals is more balanced. Most citizens cite the *blic.rs* portal (19%), while 15% quote the N1 portal and 10% the *nova.rs* portal. Expectedly, the variety of internet portals through which citizens are informed is significantly greater compared to the most often watched television.



Base: Those who follow political and social topics via internet portals (40% of the total population)

Graph 3. Leading portals for getting information


Among the citizens who are informed about political and social issues through newspapers, the majority are those who read the daily newspapers Blic (18%) and Politika (17%), while a slightly smaller share acquires information through the Informer (13%), the Večernje Novosti (11) and the Danas (11%). Other daily newspapers are mentioned much less frequently.



Base: Those who follow political and social issues through newspapers (11% of the total population)


Graph 4. Main press for getting information

In addition to the frequency of using certain media, we were interested in the level of trust citizens have in the media they follow. It is interesting that trust, on the one hand, and readership, that is, viewership, on the other hand, do not match. The Blic remains the printed medium that most citizens say they trust, followed by the Danas, Večernje Novosti, and Kurir, while citizens have somewhat less trust in Politika and Kurir, even though they are among the most read daily newspapers. It is important to note that more than a quarter of citizens state that they do not trust any print medium (29%).



Graph 5. Trust in print media


The largest share of citizens, 42 percent, state that they trust RTS, while about a quarter point out that they trust the television stations N1, Happy and Pink. Televisions Prva and B92 inspire the least confidence. Compared to previous surveys, there are no significant changes in the level of trust, except for a slightly higher percentage of trust in Happy television and less in Prva television. Unlike daily newspapers, a smaller portion of citizens states that they do not trust any television (15%).



Graph 6. Trust in television stations

According to trust in television, citizens are classified into four groups (Graph 7): those who trust exclusively pro-government media¹, those who trust exclusively government-critical media², and those who trust both pro-government media (e.g. RTS) and critical media (e.g. Nova S). The fourth group consists of citizens who do not trust any television station.

Slightly more than half of the citizens trust only pro-government media (56%), while one-fifth trust only critical media (18%). In addition, one in ten citizens states that they trust both media (11%). In the last year, there have been no major changes in the relationship to trust in pro-government and critical media (in a survey from February of this year, 53% had confidence only in pro-government, 17% in critical, and 12% in both groups of media).




Graph 7. Trust in pro-government and government-critical media

In order to better understand the patterns of use and trust in television stations as the most common source of daily information in Serbia, we also asked the citizens which cable operator they used to watch television. Four out of ten citizens indicated that they used the services of Telekom Serbia (Telekom 28%, Super Nova 9%, Iris 2%), while three out of ten indicated the services of SBB (SBB 29%, EON 1%). Slightly less than a fifth of citizens do not use the services of cable operators.

¹ Televisions with a national coverage – media with a pro-government editorial policy (RTS, Prva, Pink, Happy, B92).


² Two televisions that can be considered government-critical media (Nova S, N1).

When looking only at those who use the services of cable operators, it can be seen that one in two residents of Serbia watches television through Telekom Srbija (48%), while over a third use SBB (37%).




Graph 8. Cable operators

Citizens recognize and essentially confirm the importance of the media's role in shaping opinions and attitudes on various political issues. As many as 80% believe that the role of the media in shaping citizens' political attitudes is important. More precisely, over half believe it is very important (54%). On the other hand, only 7% of those believe that the role of the media is not important.




Graph 9. The role of the media in shaping attitudes

Aside from recognizing the importance of the media's role in shaping political attitudes, more than half of citizens (55%) also acknowledge the significant influence of politics in the media. In contrast, only 13% of citizens believe that the media in Serbia are free and independent from political influences, while a little over a quarter of citizens think that there are political pressures but that they do not threaten the freedom of the media (20%), i.e., that they threaten some, but not all the media (8%).



Graph 10. Attitudes about media freedom

The aforementioned is consistent with the finding that only about a quarter of citizens (23%) point out that they respect the media and consider them credible when they obtain information about political and social issues. Interestingly, however, the share of those, who consider state institutions, independent institutions, political leaders, non-governmental organizations, and church officials to be reliable sources, is even smaller. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that the largest percentage of citizens stated that they considered experts trustworthy when they wanted to be informed about political and social issues (39%), which can partly explain the unique role that experts play in the media in explaining these phenomena, and which differs from the role of a journalist.




Graph 11. Credible sources

2. Democracy

More than half of citizens (54%) mostly or entirely agree that, regardless of all the difficulties, democracy represents the best political system for Serbia. Less than a quarter (23%) completely or mostly disagree. There are no differences compared to the May survey, where 56% mostly or entirely agreed that democracy is the best political system for our country.


Despite all the difficulties, democracy is the best political system for our country



Graph 12. Attitudes towards democracy

On the other hand, slightly less than half of the citizens (45%) completely or mostly agree that, at this moment, it is best for Serbia to have one strong leader whom everyone would obey. This percentage is much lower than in all previous surveys, but it should be borne in mind that perhaps in telephone surveys, respondents are more inclined to answer this question positively than in face-to-face interviews. To the same question, 37% answered negatively: that they did not agree fully or mostly, while 15% did not have a strong opinion on this issue.


It is best for our country at this moment to have a strong leader that everyone would obey



Graph 13. Attitudes toward a strong leader

Interestingly, every fifth citizen (20%) is also declaratively in favor of democracy and agrees that Serbia needs a firm hand. Therefore, we wanted to determine which of these two forms the citizens prefer.

If they had to choose between these two systems, precisely half of the Serbian population would choose the democratic system, while four out of ten (41%) would choose the authoritarian system. As in the previous question, there is a difference compared to the previous (May) survey, where this relationship was reversed, and where 49% chose a system with a strong leader while a slightly smaller percentage (41%) chose a democratic one.




Graph 14. Attitudes about the political system

In order to better understand what citizens mean by democracy, we asked them to position themselves according to several dimensions of democracy, that is, to evaluate the importance of each dimension. The findings indicate that the minimum precondition of democracy (electing the government in free elections) is the most important aspect. While nine out of ten citizens (91%) state that this aspect is, at least to some extent, essential for democracy, only 3% think the opposite. When the percentage of those who think this is important is subtracted from the percentage of those who think it is not important, the net support for this position is 88% (Graph 15).

The position on the accountability of the elected government, which regularly renders accounts to citizens and their organizations, has a relatively high net support of 78%, as well as the two dimensions of liberal democracy, namely the protection of citizens from the arbitrariness of the state (human rights) with 77% of net support, and the control of government work by courts and parliament (separation and balance of powers) with 75% net support. Slightly lower net support (73%) is given to the position that the state cannot restrict to minorities the rights that the majority enjoys. In the end, the lowest net support of 68%, i.e., 20 percentage points less than the minimalist

concept of democracy, is given to the views on the equality of participants in the democratic process and the need for periodic rotation of parties in power. Serbian citizens continue to identify democracy with the possibility of voting in elections. The outcomes of elections and the equality of relations between participants are seen as somewhat less important aspects.

How important do you think the following attitudes are for democracy?



Graph 15. Attitudes about aspects of democracy

We wanted to examine how citizens see a participatory model of democracy contrasted to a representative or elite model. Half of the citizens of Serbia (48%), at least declaratively, find the participative model of democracy to be the closest to them; that is, they state that all citizens should always be actively involved in politics. In contrast, about a quarter of citizens (27%) state that it is enough for citizens to engage in politics by voting in elections (representative democracy model), and that only politicians should engage in politics, not ordinary citizens (24%) – the elite model of democracy.


When it comes to politics in Serbia, which of the above-mentioned understandings is the most suitable for you?

- All citizens should always be actively involved in politics
- It is enough for citizens to engage in politics by voting in elections
- Only politicians should deal with politics, not ordinary citizens
- Don't know / No answer



Graph 16. Attitudes about citizen participation


We also asked citizens to what extent they agree with different, often conflicting views on non-governmental organizations. The majority of citizens, four out of ten, think that non-governmental organizations protect the public interest and fight for changes in society (43%). Slightly more than a third of citizens have a negative attitude towards non-governmental organizations. 28% think that non-governmental organizations are financed from abroad and represent the interests of foreign countries, and 9% think that they represent the interests of powerful people and work against the state. Moreover, a fifth of citizens did not know the answer or did not want to answer.



Graph 17. Attitudes about non-governmental organizations


3. Domestic politics

At the very beginning, we asked the citizens about their impression of whether Serbia was moving in right or wrong direction. The largest share of citizens answered that Serbia was moving in a wrong or mostly wrong direction (39%), while a slightly smaller share, third, answered that it was moving in a good or primarily good direction. Furthermore, every fourth resident of Serbia points out that it is moving neither in a good nor a wrong direction. There is a noticeable increase in the share of those who believe Serbia is moving in the wrong direction. In May 2022, almost half of the citizens (48%) believed that Serbia was moving in a good or mostly good direction.




Graph 18. The situation in the country

Aside from citizens' prevailing negative or neutral attitude about the direction in which Serbia is moving, social and economic reasons are the dominant sources of the problems they face. More than a quarter quoted living standards and low incomes as the biggest problem. In addition, 6% cited specific problems with employment, and the same percentage mentioned high prices, 1% housing problems, and the poor positions and lack of perspective of young people, which means that 4 out of 10 citizens indicate social and economic problems as the biggest for them and their families.




Graph 19. Main personal problems

Citizens are divided on how much their quality of life depends on who is in power in Serbia. Four out of ten citizens think that their quality of life depends little or not at all on who is in power in Serbia, while the same percentage believe that it depends.




Graph 20. Quality of life depending on who is in power in Serbia

As the Covid-19 pandemic marked the previous period and touched the lives of many citizens, we wanted to determine how they assess the Government's work in managing this pandemic. Citizens are pretty divided on this issue. An almost identical percentage of citizens state that they are very or mostly dissatisfied (42%), i.e., very or mostly satisfied with how the Government managed the pandemic (40%). Less than a fifth points out that they are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.




Graph 21. Satisfaction with the Government's work during the pandemic

Attitudes about how the healthcare system handled the pandemic are somewhat positive. One-third of citizens (32%) state that they are very or mostly dissatisfied, while half are mostly or very satisfied (51%). Less than a fifth, as in the previous question regarding the Government's performance, points out that they are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.




Graph 22. Satisfaction with the healthcare system's work during the pandemic

Furthermore, we asked citizens if they had been vaccinated against Covid-19 with a vaccine approved by the competent regulatory body of Serbia. More than half answered that they had been vaccinated (57%), while slightly less than half (42%) had not been vaccinated. When interpreting these results, it should be taken into account that the framework of this research includes only the adult population of the inhabitants of Serbia and that we do not know whether they received one or more doses of vaccines.




Graph 23. Vaccination against Covid-19

In the period preceding the beginning of this research, an important public topic was the holding of EuroPride in Belgrade. Seven out of ten citizens said they did not at all, or mostly did not support the holding of EuroPride in Belgrade, while only 15% said the opposite.



Graph 24. Support for holding EuroPride


Among those who heard about the holding of EuroPride, a pronounced majority, as many as three quarters, agreed that the event had been held under pressure from the West, while only one in ten citizens disagreed.



Graph 25. EuroPride held under pressure from the West


Although most citizens did not support the holding of EuroPride in Belgrade and believe that the event was held under pressure from the West, opinions on 'family walks,' i.e., rallies where opposition to this event was expressed, are divided. While 46% of citizens mostly or completely supported 'family walks' or processions, 34% did not support them at all or mostly. Still, around a fifth of citizens has no expressed opinion.

It is important to underline that strong opposition to holding EuroPride (63%) does not lead directly to strong support for 'family walks' (28%).



Graph 26. Support for Family walks/processions

Another topic that was discussed by the public in the previous period is the possibility of introducing mandatory military service. Slightly less than two-thirds of citizens (62%) stated that they would support the introduction of mandatory military service in Serbia, while a third pointed out that they would not (35%).




Graph 27. Compulsory military service

4. Local community

To begin with, we asked the citizens if their impression was that the municipality they lived in was moving in a good or a wrong direction. While slightly more than a third (37%) answers that it is moving in a wrong or mostly wrong direction, a third (32%) thinks it is moving in a right or mostly right direction. Every fourth citizen (28%) believes it is moving in neither a right nor a wrong direction.

When we compare these findings with the question about the direction in which Serbia is moving, no major differences can be seen, although a larger portion of citizens have more firm attitudes. There are fewer indecisive ones when it comes to Serbia, which means that citizens are more particular about the direction in which the state is moving than about the direction of local self-government.



Graph 28. The situation in the municipality


Serbian citizens generally do not follow political events at the local level. When asked to what extent they follow political events in their local community, half answered that they follow a little or moderately, while just under a third (31%) do not follow events at all. Less than one-fifth answered that they follow political events often or very often.

To what extent do you follow political events in your local community?



Graph 29. Information about events in the municipality


Among those who follow political events in the local community, the largest percentage (42%) follows political events through local portals and a slightly smaller share (34%) through local television. Other channels (newspapers, radio) are less represented. In contrast to the patterns of information at the national level, where citizens are informed to the greatest extent through television and then through the Internet, citizens at the local level rely more on Internet portals. Slightly less than a fifth of those who follow political events in the local community stated that they do not follow the local sources of information offered to them.



Base: Those who are informed about political events in the local community (69% of the total population)


Graph 30. Sources of information in the municipality

While the views on the quality of life and government at the national level were divided, a somewhat different picture can be seen at the local level. To a lesser extent, citizens think that the quality of life for them and their families depends on who runs the municipality. More than half of the citizens (53%) think that the quality of life does not depend at all, or a little, on who is in power in the municipality. Only a quarter (28%) believe that it depends.




Graph 31. Quality of life depending on who is in power in municipality

Almost half of the citizens do not see anyone in their community who is working to solve local problems. Only 37% say that someone is working to solve problems in community.



Graph 32. Is someone working on problem-solving


Among those who point out that someone is working to solve problems in the local community, almost half stated that it is the municipal or local self-government. In addition, a third point out that it is the citizens themselves who unite and organize, followed by political movements and parties (20%), the individuals concerned by these problems (17%), and non-governmental organizations (10%).



Base: Those who indicated that someone is working to solve problems related to life in the local community (37% of the population)


Graph 33. Who is working on problem-solving

We wanted to assess the extent to which citizens are in contact with political actors at the local level. We asked whether, in the past year, representatives of a political organization came to their home address to promote their activities. A little over a third of the citizens answered that in the previous year (a referendum and election year), representatives of political organizations came to them, while a little under two-thirds stated that they had not.




Graph 34. Contact from political organizations

Aside from whether actors participate in solving problems in their community and who these actors are, we also asked citizens whether they undertook or actively participated in any action or initiative in the last year to solve a problem in the local community. One out of five citizens participated in actions or initiatives in the local community, while 5% responded that they initiated such activities.



Graph 35. Participation and initiation of local actions

Among those who participated in solving problems in the local community, half worked on solving communal problems, third environmental problems, and one-fifth cultural-educational and social-economic problems. In contrast, one in ten active citizens participated in solving some other problems.



Base: Those whom themselves undertook or actively participated in any action or initiative (20% of the population)

Graph 36. Problems being solved by local initiatives

Four in five citizens did not participate in solving problems in their local community. Half of them are, in principle, not against this type of engagement but state that they do not have time or do not know how to do something. On the other hand, slightly less than half (44%) declare not to be interested in such engagement or do not believe that it can be effective.




Base: Those who did not undertake or actively participate in any action or initiative (79% of the total population)

Graph 37. Reasons for non-participation in local initiatives

Although they did not participate in solving problems in the local community, the largest number answered that they would do something about communal (38%) and environmental (36%) problems, which shows that these two topics are equally important to both inactive and active citizens.


In contrast to active citizens, inactive citizens state that they would participate in actions or initiatives that would solve social and economic problems (30%) rather than cultural and educational ones (23%). Slightly less than a fifth of those who did not participate in solving problems in the local community would not be actively involved, i.e., they do not know which problems should be tackled.



Base: Those who did not undertake or actively participate in any action or initiative (79% of the total population)


Graph 38. Reasons for possible participation in local initiatives

At the end of this segment, we wanted to examine the attitudes towards the basic form of direct participation in the decision-making of their local community (Serbian: mesna zajednica). To begin with, a quarter of citizens stated that they were familiar with some local community activities. Two-thirds of the citizens said they were not familiar with it, while one out of ten thought there were no such activities or no local communities.³



Graph 39. Familiarity with activities of local communities

Interestingly, despite little familiarity with the activities of local communities, one-fifth of citizens participated in elections for local community councils, while four-fifths did not participate or did not even hear that such elections existed.



Graph 40. Participation in elections for local communities

Finally, we checked whether citizens participated in local community assemblies as a form of direct participation of citizens in the implementation of local self-government policies. The level of participation, in this case, is even lower – only one out of ten citizens points out that they have participated in local community citizens' assemblies, while nine out of ten have either not participated or have not even heard of these assemblies.




Graph 41. Participation in local communities' assemblies

³ In some municipalities in Serbia there are no local communities or they exist only formally.


5. Elections

Almost one out of five states that they occasionally vote, while three-quarters of citizens say they always vote. The public's widespread belief about high election abstinance is partly a consequence of the inflated Voters' Register. When asked whether they regularly vote, only seven percent of citizens answered that they do not vote.



Graph 42. Voting practices


Regarding membership in political parties, two-thirds of citizens state that they are not members and have never been. Every fifth citizen used to be a member but is not anymore. Only 12% of citizens point out that they are currently members of a political party.



Graph 43. Membership in political parties


Half of the citizens of Serbia incline towards some political parties. Slightly less than a third of citizens say they are closer to the parties in power (31%), while slightly under a fifth say they are closer to the opposition parties (18%). In contrast, half of the citizens are not close to the parties in power or the opposition (49%). Compared to the surveys

done last year (the year marked by the end of the boycott), when the share of inclined citizens dropped, the percentage of those who are not close to either increased again.




Graph 44. Political inclination

Citizens are divided in assessing the quality of the elections held in April 2022. While 42% of citizens think that the elections were not free and fair, almost the same percentage (44%) believe they were free and fair. The remaining 14% of citizens did not know or did not want to answer this question.



Graph 45. Free and fair elections


About half of the citizens think there was vote rigging on the Election Day, in the elections held in April, to a greater or lesser extent, while a third of citizens point out that there was no vote rigging.



Graph 46. Vote rigging on the Election Day

In order to better understand the attitude of citizens towards various election irregularities, we presented them with four irregularities or anomalies that are most often mentioned in public and asked them to choose one that they think is the biggest problem for the elections in Serbia. The highest percentage of citizens (32%) said that the biggest problem for elections in Serbia was that some political parties or candidates pressured voters to vote for them.


A slightly smaller share of citizens (22%) state that the biggest problem for the elections is that some parties or candidates use state resources (such as state positions, official premises, and cars) for their promotion. The remaining two problems were mentioned far less often. An equal percentage of citizens (11%) mentioned that political parties or candidates did not have equal access to the media to present their ideas and inaccurate Voters' Register as the biggest problem for the elections in Serbia. Only 10% of citizens stated that none of the above was a problem. Only 10% of citizens stated that none of the above was a problem.



Graph 47. Types of election irregularities

To better understand the attitudes towards the opposition, we also asked citizens to assess whether the candidates from the opposition were sufficiently present in the media during the election campaign. Citizens are divided on this issue similarly to the general assessment of the quality of the elections held in April 2022. While 46% of citizens think that the candidates from the opposition were not sufficiently present in the media, slightly less, 41% think that they were.


Do you think that the opposition candidates were sufficiently present in the media during the election campaign?



Graph 48. Presence of the opposition in the media

Given that after the boycott period 2019-2022, the National Assembly was re-constituted in a way that the opposition is notably present, we looked into whether the citizens thought that it was good or bad for democracy in Serbia that MPs from opposition parties were elected to the National Assembly. The vast majority of citizens (79%) think it is good for democracy that the opposition is in the Parliament, while only one in ten citizens think the opposite.


Do you think it is good or bad for democracy in Serbia that after the last parliamentary elections MPs from opposition parties were elected to the National Assembly?



Graph 49. Presence of the opposition in the National Assembly


Since the first special sitting of the National Assembly was held while this research was conducted, and the Report on the negotiation process with Pristina was discussed under the public eye, we asked the citizens if they followed the live broadcast of the sittings of the National Assembly this year. The vast majority of citizens, 71%, did not follow the broadcasts, while a quarter stated that they did (28%).

Did you watch the live broadcast of the sittings of the National Assembly this year?



Graph 50. Watching live broadcasts of the National Assembly


After the elections held on April 3, at the time of the research, the process of forming the Government was still not completed. That is why we asked citizens what they thought was the reason for such a long process. Half of the citizens believe that the formation of the Government takes a long time because this is in the interest of the ruling party. About a quarter believes that the formation of the Government takes a long time due to objective circumstances. One in ten people states that the formation of the Government does not take too long, and the remaining citizens did not know or did not want to answer.



Graph 51. Duration of the Government formation


6. Kosovo

When it comes to expectations as to whether the situation in Kosovo will deteriorate dramatically in the coming months, the citizens are divided. While 39% of citizens think that it will definitely or probably not worsen, 37% think that it probably or definitely will, and the remaining fifth of citizens are undecided.



Graph 52. Deterioration of the situation in Kosovo

Half of the citizens (52%) who think the situation in Kosovo could worsen are somewhat or very worried, while only one out of ten is not worried.



Base: Those who expect that the situation in Kosovo will dramatically deteriorate in the coming months (37% of the population)


Graph 53. Concern over the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo

The next set of questions covers the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. We investigated the extent to which citizens expect the dialogue to lead to solutions that will ensure lasting stability and peace. As many as 70% of citizens do not expect the dialogue to lead towards lasting stability and peace. One in four citizens believes the opposite. Only 5% of citizens fully expect the dialogue to lead to permanent stability and peace, while 19% mostly expect such a solution.



Graph 54. Expectations from the Belgrade-Priština dialogue

In recent years, the public has been discussing different Kosovo solutions. Hence, the acceptance of these solutions was tested. The only thing that is acceptable for most citizens is for the dialogue with Kosovo to continue without a time limit and the recognition of its independence. Almost two-thirds of citizens (62%) say that this solution is mostly (22%) or completely acceptable (even 40%). In contrast, only a fifth (18%) pointed out that this is mostly or completely unacceptable for them.




Graph 55. Attitudes towards solutions for Kosovo

The citizens had similar views in connection with the two solutions according to which Serbia abandons dialogue and worsens relations with the West. Nearly a quarter (24%) of citizens said that for them, it was acceptable that Serbia regained Kosovo, with the support of Russia, and tightened relations with the West, while this solution was completely or mostly unacceptable for more than half of citizens (55%). Similar findings were obtained for the solution according to which Serbia abandons the dialogue and freezes the conflict with Kosovo, even though this would block Serbia's European integration – a fifth of citizens say that this is acceptable for them, while 55% point out that it is not.

The solution by which Serbia and Kosovo mutually recognize each other within the existing borders and become EU members is acceptable to a fifth of citizens (21%), but as many as 63% of citizens say that it is unacceptable for them.

The remaining two solutions seem the least acceptable. The solution discussed in the context of the latest proposals by France and Germany, for Serbia not to recognize Kosovo, but to allow it to become a member of international organizations, is acceptable to 17% of citizens and unacceptable to 65%. Finally, the solution discussed in previous years, the demarcation of Serbia and Kosovo, whereby the North of Kosovo should belong to Serbia, and part of Preševo and Bujanovac to independent Kosovo, is acceptable only for 16% of citizens, and unacceptable for two thirds.

We researched which international actors are the ones that, in the opinion of the citizens, should be more involved with the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. The largest percentage of citizens (29%) mentions Russia, followed immediately by the United Nations (25%). A significantly smaller share of citizens indicates that it should be Western countries – the European Union (12%), and China (8%). The United States of America and NATO are mentioned only by a very small percentage of citizens. One out of ten citizens (11%) believes no actors should be more active in the dialogue.




Graph 56. Presence of foreign actors in the dialogue

With the next set of questions, we wanted to understand better how Serbia's citizens see their role in the relations between Serbia and Kosovo. First of all, Serbia's citizens think they are not sufficiently informed about the dialogue, and they want to have a say in potential solutions. The largest percentage of citizens (79%) agreed with the view that the citizens of Serbia do not know enough about the dialogue with Kosovo and that they should be better informed. Furthermore, 74% of citizens believe any potential agreement with Kosovo should be confirmed in a referendum.


Serbian citizens see tensions with Kosovo as an obstacle to solving their problems (58%) and the possibility of an agreement with Kosovo as an opportunity for a better life (57%). Finally, the only position where there were more negative than positive

responses concerns personal commitment. Only 32% of citizens point out that they are ready to set aside a part of their income to help protect Serbian interests in Kosovo, while more than half (56%) disagreed.



Graph 57. Attitudes about the dialogue and Kosovo


We also wanted to understand how the citizens of Serbia see the nature of the conflict in Kosovo as instrumental, artificially created by the will of political elites, or essentialist, determined by history. Two-thirds of citizens (65%) believe that politicians artificially created the conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, and only a quarter, 26%, believe it was inevitable.



Graph 58. Causes of conflict in Kosovo

The second question concerned recent history. We asked the citizens who they thought won the war in 1999, NATO or FR Yugoslavia. Almost half of the citizens (46%) answered that NATO had won the war in 1999, and 24% that no one had won. One-fifth of Serbian citizens think that Yugoslavia won the war in 1999, i.e., 19%.

Who do you think won in the war of 1999, NATO or FR Yugoslavia?



Graph 59. Victory in the 1999 war

We were also interested in how often Serbian citizens visited Kosovo after 1999. A huge percentage of Serbian citizens (84%) have not been to Kosovo since 1999, 6% have been only once, 8% more than once, and only 2% say that they often go to Kosovo.


Have you been to Kosovo after 1999 and how often?



Graph 60. Visits to Kosovo after 1999


7. Foreign policy

In the part of the research that concerned foreign policy, we started with the question of how citizens would feel if there were major foreign policy changes or reversals. Citizens are mostly divided about how they would feel if Serbia joined the European Union, with 28% who would be happy, 33% who would be worried, and as many as 36% who would be indifferent. Compared to May, the percentage of those who would be happy was the same. The percentage of those who are indifferent has increased.




Graph 61. Accession to the European Union

Citizens' views are somewhat different on the issue of the termination of Serbia's negotiations with the European Union. The largest percentage feel indifferent to the termination of negotiations with the EU, 43%, while there would be more citizens who would be worried (35%) than those who would be happy (only 19%).




Graph 62. Termination of negotiations with the EU

When we asked how citizens would feel if Serbia terminated negotiations with the EU and formed an alliance with Russia, the answers we received were similar to the question of joining the EU – 35% would be worried, 33% indifferent, and 28% would be happy.



Graph 63. Alliance with Russia

If Serbia recognized Kosovo as an independent state and, in return, became a member of the EU, the majority of citizens, two-thirds, would be worried, only one in ten citizens would be happy, and a fifth would be indifferent.



Graph 64. Recognition of Kosovo

Despite the mentioned indifference towards the accession to the European Union, the majority of citizens have a clear position on the potential referendum on accession. Citizens are almost evenly divided, with 42% who would vote for joining the EU and 45% who would vote against it.



Graph 65. Vote in the EU referendum


We also asked citizens if they had family members who lived, worked, or studied in the EU or Russia. The largest number of citizens (70%) answered that they did not have family members in these countries, while more than a quarter of citizens (27%) answered that they had family members in the European Union. Only three percent of citizens answered that they had family members who live, work or study in Russia or the EU and Russia.



Graph 66. Family members in the EU or Russia

We were also interested in the views of Serbian citizens on the policy of military neutrality, i.e., the alternatives – investing in military alliances with the West or Russia. More than two-thirds of citizens (69%) think that Serbia should remain militarily neutral, one-fifth (19%) think that Serbia should form a military alliance with Russia, while only one out of ten citizens think that Serbia should form a military alliance with Western countries (9%).


Which of these views on the policy of military neutrality is closest to yours?



Graph 67. Views on military neutrality

The pressures on Serbia to take a stand in the conflict between the West and Russia have been going on for awhile. However, they have intensified since the start of the war in Ukraine. That is why we asked citizens how they saw these pressures. The vast majority of citizens (71%) mostly or completely agreed that the West was putting pressure on Serbia to turn its back on Russia, while 14% did not agree at all or mostly did not agree with that position.


The West is putting pressure on Serbia to turn its back on Russia



Graph 68. Western pressure on Serbia

On the other hand, a significantly smaller share of citizens believes that there is pressure from the opposite direction. Only a quarter of citizens (27%) agree that Russia is putting pressure on Serbia to give up EU integration, while 42% disagree with that view, in general, or mostly.


Russia is putting pressure on Serbia to abandon the EU integrations



Graph 69. Russia's pressure on Serbia

The following questions regard Serbia's regional position and relations with its neighbors. Almost half of the citizens (47%) do not agree with the statement that Serbia is economically and militarily the most powerful country in the region. A third (31%) agree with that statement, while a fifth (19%) is undecided.


To what extent do you agree with the following statement that Serbia is economically and militarily the most powerful country in the region?



Graph 70. Position of Serbia in the region


We also examined how citizens assessed Serbia's relations with the countries of the region. Hungary has the best rating of all six offered countries (76%) of citizens, while only 3% of citizens think that relations between Serbia and Hungary are bad. The situation is similar to North Macedonia, where Serbia has good relations for 63% of citizens and bad for only 4%. Relations between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are good for 46% of citizens and bad for 15%.

Citizens of Serbia are divided in their assessment of relations with Montenegro. 30% rate them as good and 30% as bad, while most citizens rate these relations as mediocre. Citizens mostly assess Serbia's relations with Albania and Croatia as negative. A quarter of citizens think that relations with Albania are good, but more (42%) think they are bad. The relations with Croatia were assessed the least positively. Only 12% of citizens said they were good, and as many as 62% said they were bad.



Graph 71. Relations of Serbia with the neighbors

Finally, the citizens were asked about the Open Balkans as an initiative for the economic and political connection of the Western Balkans countries, whose members are Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia. More than half of citizens (57%) said they supported this initiative, while one-fifth (22%) did not. The rest of the citizens had never heard of this initiative, did not know, or did not respond.




Graph 72. Open Balkans

8. War in Ukraine

In the last section of the research, we examined citizens' attitudes towards the war in Ukraine, and how the war influenced the position of Serbia and its citizens personally. First, we wanted to determine whether Serbian citizens are getting informed about Ukraine, how well they were informed, and through which outlets. Most Serbian citizens (80%) follow events in Ukraine occasionally or daily, while a fifth do not. In May of this year, 81% said they followed the events in Ukraine.


Do you follow the events in Ukraine?



Graph 73. Following events in Ukraine


Citizens who follow events in Ukraine most often cite television as the main source of information (60%) and, to a much lesser extent, internet portals (20%) and social networks (13%). Conversations with family and friends are mentioned by 6% of citizens as the main source of information.

What is your main source of information about the course of the armed conflict in Ukraine?



Graph 74. Obtaining information about the war in Ukraine


Citizens who follow events in Ukraine via television most often mention RTS (38%) and Happy television (32%), a smaller percentage of citizens mentioned Pink, N1, and Prva, while only a few percent mentioned other televisions.



Base: those who cite television as the main source of information about the course of the armed conflict in Ukraine (60% of the total population)

Graph 75. Televisions and information about Ukraine


Those who follow events in Ukraine via Internet portals usually do so via the N1 and Nova portals, somewhat less via Blic, and then via Russian and other foreign and national independent portals.



Base: those who cite internet portals as the main source of information about the course of the armed conflict in Ukraine (20% of the total population)

Graph 76. Internet portals and information about Ukraine

A smaller percentage of citizens follow events in Ukraine through social networks. Among them, almost half mentioned Facebook, while a significantly smaller percentage of citizens mentioned Twitter, Instagram, and other networks.



Base: those who cite social networks as the main source of information about the course of the armed conflict in Ukraine (13% of the total population)

Graph 77. Social networks and obtaining information about Ukraine


The largest share of citizens, almost two-thirds (64%), see the West, namely the United States, NATO, and the European Union, as the actors most responsible for the armed conflict in Ukraine. A significantly smaller percentage (15%) cited Russia as the most responsible, while 5% Ukraine.



Graph 78. Responsibility for the conflict in Ukraine

When we asked the citizens to decide which position was closer to them in the armed conflict in Ukraine, more than half (58%) stated that they were closer to the Russian position, and a fifth (22%) that they were more sympathetic to the Ukrainian side. Additionally, a fifth did not know or did not want to answer this question. In May of this

year, two-thirds (66%) of the citizens stated that the Russian position in the conflict was closer to them if they had to choose, while only 12% opted for the Ukrainian side.




Graph 79. Russian and Ukrainian sides in the conflict

In connection with Serbia's attitude towards the war in Ukraine, six out of ten citizens (61%) rather believe that Serbia should maintain good relations with Russia, even at the cost of giving up on the EU, while a smaller share (19%) believes that Serbia should impose sanctions on Russia and harmonize its foreign policy with the EU. The same percentage (19%) did not know or did not want to answer this question. In May of this year, when we asked a similar question, only 9% of citizens said that Serbia should harmonize its foreign policy with the EU and impose sanctions on Russia.




Graph 80. Serbia's attitude towards the war in Ukraine

When it comes to the economic consequences of the armed conflict in Ukraine for Serbia, more than half of the citizens (58%) believe that the war seriously threatened the economy of Serbia. A quarter of citizens think that certain economic sectors were harmed but that the state repaired them. Only one out of ten citizens think the war did not affect the economy of Serbia.




Graph 81. Economic consequences of the war

As an economic consequence of the war in Ukraine, a huge percentage of citizens (93%) expect that during the coming winter, the prices of food, electricity, and fuel will further increase in Serbia, while only 6% think that this will not happen.



Graph 82. Expected price increase


Those who think there will be additional price increases are at the same time very worried about it – four out of five citizens (78%) are quite or very worried. In contrast, only six percent of them said they were not worried at all.



Base: Those who expect prices to increase further during the winter (93% of the total population)


Graph 83. Worry about the price increases

In contrast to the almost universal expectation of price increases, two-thirds of citizens said they expected shortages of electricity and energy-generating products in the upcoming winter, while slightly less than a third said they did not.



Graph 84. Expected shortages


Similarly to price increases, the vast majority of those who expect shortages are somewhat or very worried about it (81%), while only 4 percent are not worried at all.



Base: those who expect that there will be a shortage of electricity and other energy-generating products during the winter (63% of the total population)

Graph 85. Worry about the shortages


Finally, we asked the citizens if they expected the EU or Russia to help Serbia in case of electricity shortages and other energy-generating products. Citizens are divided between those who believe that Serbia will receive external aid if there is a shortage of electricity and energy-generating products (46%) and those who think that aid will not come (48%). Among those who expect help, most citizens expect that help will come only from Russia (26%), followed by help from both Russia and the EU (12%), and the smallest percentage expects help only from the EU (8%).




Graph 86. Assistance from the EU and Russia

9. Demography

In the research, citizens' answers to eight socio-demographic questions were collected: about the highest level of education they achieved, current work status, the financial situation of the family, current marital status and number of household members, national identification, attitude towards religion, and attendance at religious services.




Graph 87. Level of education




Graph 88. Work status

Which of these answers best describes your family's financial situation?




Graph 89. Financial situation


What is your current marital status?




Graph 90. Marital status



Graph 91. Members of household



Graph 92. National identity



Graph 93 Attitudes towards religion



Graph 94. Attendance at religious services

Appendices

a. Detailed methodology

Formation of the sample

The research used a three-stage stratified random sample, with the territory of the polling stations as the first stage, the household as the second, and respondents within the household as the third. For the first stage, geographic stratification was used. The percentage of required respondents in the sample in six regions (Belgrade, Vojvodina, West, Šumadija, East, South) was determined based on the estimate of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia on the number of adult residents in 2021. Using data from the Republic Electoral Commission from 2022, the number of polling stations proportional to the number of adult residents in each geographic stratum was determined, with an equal number of respondents in each polling station. The polling stations were afterward randomly selected within each geographic stratum. In addition, care was taken to ensure that polling station areas of different sizes (small, up to 400 voters, medium from 400 to 1000, and large, over 1000 voters) were also represented in the sample in proportion to their number in Serbia.

In the second stage, households were selected by random selection of the starting point from the list of addresses in the polling station area, after which the interviewers would select every second or third household, depending on the type of place. In the third stage, respondents who last celebrated their birthdays were selected within the household.

Post-stratification

As seen in Table 1, the final sample has a more rural population than the population of Serbia. That is, it contains slightly more responses from citizens over 65 years of age, which deviates from the demographic characteristics of the Republic of Serbia. In order to reconcile the deviations of the relevant demographic characteristics of the sample with the population, the data were weighted after collection. More specifically, iterative proportional fitting (raking) was performed.

The results were weighted by strata corresponding to the estimated structure of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia based on gender (male, female), age (18-34 years, 35-64 years, 65+ years), region (Belgrade, Vojvodina, Šumadija and Western, Southern and Eastern Serbia), type of settlement (urban, rural) level of education (primary, secondary, higher). For the first four strata, we used the latest estimates of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia for 2021. As for the level of education, projections based on the results of the 2011 census were used. For the post-

stratification of questions about voting, data from the Republic Electoral Commission on the results of the elections held on April 3, 2022, were used.

After weighting, all sample characteristics agree with the population characteristics within the margin of error (Table 1). The minimum weighting was 0.43 (five male respondents, over 65 years old, highly educated, from urban areas in Southern and Eastern Serbia), and the maximum was 2.36 (female respondent, aged 18-34, from a rural area in Southern Serbia, with primary education). Due to the weighting of the change in percentages of responses to different questions, they usually spanned within a few percentage points. Based on the above, the results are representative of the population of the Republic of Serbia (without Kosovo).

Statistics of the data collection process

After quality control, exactly 1,000 surveys were included in the analysis. On the other hand, 1,626 citizens refused to participate in the survey. Therefore, the response rate of citizens who accepted participation in the research was 38%, according to the calculation $1,000 / (1,000 + 1,626)$. In other words, two out of five asked citizens agreed to participate in the research. Among those who refused to participate were men (46%) and women (54%). The most common reason they stated for their refusal was the lack of time due to obligations (35% of all refusals).

Furthermore, the interviewers noted that there was no answer in 3,256 households (dwellings where no one was at home or where people did not open the door). If non-openings of doors were included in the response rate calculation, it would count for 17%, according to the calculation $1000 / (1,000 + 1,626 + 3,256)$. In other words, one out of five households visited by the interviewers participated in the survey.

Data collection and quality control

Interviewers collected field data over 11 days, from September 24 to October 3, 2022, from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. (until 8 p.m. on weekends). The interviewers used tablets with a platform for entering answers and completed the survey by talking to citizens.

CRTA activists participated in the research as interviewers. All had experience in election observation, while some had previous experience conducting surveys. All interviewers received training about surveys and the use of the data entry platform, and all completed a test questionnaire before starting the survey. A total of 82 interviewers participated in the survey. The quality control of the questionnaire was carried out, through daily communication with the interviewers, tracking the GPS location, duration of questionnaire completing, and logical control of the answers. Based on quality control, unsatisfactory questionnaires were removed from further analysis.

Questionnaire

The questionnaire had 115 questions, and the average survey lasted 31 minute. Except for five open-ended questions, all other were closed-ended. Among the answers offered was an option for respondents who did not know how to answer the question or do not want to answer (DK, NA). The order of the answers offered in the questions was random, except in cases where the Likert scale was used (e.g., the range between strongly disagree – strongly agree). The questionnaire contained eight socio-demographic questions related to education, financial situation, work status, marital status, number of household members, national identity, and two about religiosity. Topics covered in the questionnaire, in addition to socio-demographic characteristics, are:

- Media and information (10)
- Democracy and political attitudes (16)
- Current political events (6)
- Local community and citizen participation (14)
- Elections (11)
- Kosovo (18)
- Foreign policy positions (16)
- The war in Ukraine (16)

b. Description of the sample

<i>Table 1. Description of the sample by strata (%)</i>				
Characteristics of the sample		SORS 2021	Before weights	Weighted
Sex	Male	48	52	46
	Female	52	48	54
Age	18-34	24	16	23
	35-64	50	51	51
	65+	26	32	26
Region	Beograd	25	26	27
	Vojvodina	27	25	28
	Šumadija and Western Serbia	27	27	24
	Southern and Eastern Serbia	21	22	21
Type of place	Urban	61	49	59
	Rural	39	51	41

Table 2. Description of the sample by socio-demographic variables (%)

Characteristics of the sample		2020 Nov	2021 Apr	2021 Oct	2022 Feb	2022 May	2022 Sep
Education	Incomplete or completed primary school (primary school)	12	12	12	13	13	20
	High school	50	54	53	52	52	55
	Higher school or faculty (HE)	38	34	35	34	34	25
Financial situation	I don't have enough money, often not even for food	6	6	7	6	6	6
	I have enough for food, but I can hardly buy clothes	15	14	17	13	15	12
	I have enough money for food and clothes, but not for major purchases, such as a TV or a refrigerator	41	36	32	36	37	38
	I also have money for larger purchases, such as a television or a refrigerator	28	35	36	33	31	36
	I can buy almost anything I want	8	8	6	9	8	8
Employment status	Full-time employees; they work in their own company or are self-employed	34	35	35	-	40	31
	Temporary employees, agency employees	11	8	8	-	10	11
	They work without an employment contract or without a written contract	3	2	2	-	2	2
	They work on their property	3	3	4	-	4	5
	Housewives	5	3	4	-	3	6
	Retired people	25	26	27	-	24	29
	Pupils or students	5	5	4	-	5	5
	Unemployed	12	15	14	-	12	11

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