

# ATTITUDES OF SERBIAN CITIZENS

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CRTA:

# ABOUT PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES **2020**

March 2021, Belgrade



The aim of the research was to determine the attitudes of Serbian citizens regarding political issues, as well as the degree of their readiness to participate in democratic processes that include various forms of civic participation – from voting in the elections to initiating and participating in actions.

The research is a noteworthy presentation of the democratic state of society. The extent to which citizens are ready to get involved in social processes, to exercise their civil rights and to influence decision-makers are indicators of the “health” of a democracy.

We would like to thank all the participants in this research, especially the operators for their dedication and professionalism, as well as to all those who, with their advice and suggestions, helped the CRTA team in designing and conducting this research.

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## Socio-political context

The public opinion poll conducted in November 2020 was preceded by a politically, economically, socially and health-wise turbulent year. Boycott of elections by a significant part of the opposition deepened the crisis of Serbian institutions, while the coronavirus pandemic left consequences in all the aforementioned aspects of life in Serbia.

The state of emergency, which was in force from March 15<sup>th</sup> to May 6<sup>th</sup>, 2020, postponed regular parliamentary, provincial and local elections. Instead of April 26<sup>th</sup>, the elections were held at all levels on June 21<sup>st</sup>. The election campaign was therefore temporarily suspended for more than 50 days. CRTA's observation mission estimated that the 2020 parliamentary elections were the worst that it had observed so far, with noted irregularities that could affect the election results in 8-10% of polling stations. In addition, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) stated in the report that the elections were "held in the context of intense political polarisation and increasingly rigid partisanship", indicating the general political environment in 2020. A significant part of the opposition boycotted the elections, at one or all levels, while only three electoral lists, in addition to four minority ones, entered the Parliament, gathered around Aleksandar Vučić's Serbian Progressive Party, Ivica Dačić's Socialist Party of Serbia and Aleksandar Šapić's Serbian Patriotic Alliance (SPAS). All three electoral lists have entered the newly formed government, and the only opposition in the Serbian parliament currently consists of representatives of national minorities. As a result of several factors, including the boycott and the pandemic, 48.93% of voters went to the polls, which is significantly less than in the previous parliamentary election, where the turnout was 56.07%.

The boycott of the elections was preceded by the boycott of Parliament by the majority of opposition MPs during 2019, which was one of the direct motives for the inter-party dialogue (IPD) on election conditions, which began in the summer that same year. The results of the dialogue, initiated by representatives of the civil society and academia, and in its second phase mediated by the European Parliament, were limited – both in legal changes and in practice. In addition to the lack of substantial progress in key areas, such as equality of participants in the elections, the 2020 election process will be remembered for the changes made to some of the key rules just before the start of the campaign, as well as during the campaign. Such changes are contrary to the rules of good practice and international democratic standards, especially given that they were not publicly debated or envisaged by the IPD - the best example being the lowering of the electoral threshold from 5% to 3% in February 2020, and introducing weighted quotients for national minority parties.

After the elections, and after the voting was repeated at 234 polling stations (the most in the last two decades), the 12<sup>th</sup> convocation of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia was constituted on August 3<sup>rd</sup>, while the government was not formed until October 28<sup>th</sup>. After the appointment of Prime Minister Ana Brnabić and the

announcement of the composition of the new Government of Serbia, the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić announced that the mandate of the Government would be limited until April 2022 at the latest, which is an unprecedented statement.

Aside from the elections, the social climate was shaped by the coronavirus epidemic, which was officially announced in Serbia on March 19<sup>th</sup>, a few days after the declaration of the state of emergency. Initial statements by officials and representatives of the Government of Serbia Infectious Diseases Crisis Response Team established to prevent the spread of Covid-19 ranged from claims that it is “the funniest virus ever”, through claims that coronavirus is weaker than seasonal flu, to calls for Serbian citizens to go to shopping in Milan because women allegedly cannot die from the effects of the coronavirus. Soon after, there was a sharp change in rhetoric and the introduction of some of the strictest measures in the fight against the pandemic. From the funniest virus to the complete lockdown and warnings that cemeteries would not be big enough, the citizens of Serbia received conflicting information and divergent messages from various officials. Communication was not the only controversial aspect of dealing with the epidemiological crisis - non-transparency regarding public procurement (i.e. ventilators) and official figures (number of infected and deceased persons) deepened the distrust of a part of the population towards official sources of information.

During the state of emergency, the existing dissatisfaction and the trend of polarisation were additionally emphasised by protest actions – simultaneous “pot banging” by the opposition and “torch flaming” by the ruling party supporters. Tensions over pandemic measures escalated in early July when President Vučić announced the introduction of a new curfew, followed by several days of protests in Belgrade during which police inflicted brutality and, according to civil society organisations, showed excessive use of force against demonstrators. The protests soon subsided, inter alia, due to the lack of political articulation of discontent in the streets. Sporadic protests, mainly focused on environmental issues, continued during the summer of 2020, but none of these events had serious political consequences.

The economic and foreign policy aspects of the coronavirus crisis were also visible - the impact of the lockdown on the Serbian economy, as well as state aid measures, including a one-time payment of 100 euros to all Serbian citizens just before the elections. The dilemma between public health and the economy has marked numerous public debates, and the impression is that Serbia, after the state of emergency, gave priority to the latter.

The year in which CRTA conducted this research was also the first in which, since the beginning of the EU integration process, Serbia has not opened a single chapter of the acquis. In what was probably the harshest report so far, the European Commission states that “the work of civil society takes place in an increasingly polarised atmosphere that is not open to criticism”, and that “the newly constituted Serbian Parliament is marked by an overwhelming majority of the ruling coalition and the absence of a viable opposition, a setting not conducive to political pluralism in the country.” During 2020, the approach of the state leadership to the People’s Republic of China was of greatest

intensity thus far, which was emphasised by the active promotion of relations between the two countries, especially in the context of assistance during the pandemic. Serbia's foreign policy position is further complicated by the signing of the Washington documents in September and related doubts voiced even in the expert public.

Civil society and the media in Serbia have also gone through a difficult and troublesome year. In July 2020, the Directorate for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, within the Ministry of Finance, requested that commercial banks disclose data on transactions of more than 50 individuals and organisations. In addition to non-governmental organisations, the list also included the media, as well as one opposition politician. In a letter to the United Nations, the Ministry of Finance called for a "strategic analysis" in order for the Directorate to support "anti-money laundering capacities for terrorist financing", but the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) reacted shortly. The FATF's response to UN rapporteurs states that, based on international standards, Serbia has no right to request such data unless there is reasonable suspicion that organisations or individuals are involved in terrorist financing, and that unjustified use of the law intimidates civil society and human rights defenders. Until the publication of this report, the Government of Serbia has not commented on the findings of the FATF.

Besides the fact that investigative media and journalist associations were on the list of the Directorate for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, the position of the media in Serbia further deteriorated during 2020, especially in the context of the pandemic. At the end of March, the Serbian Government passed a controversial conclusion that required the centralisation of information about coronavirus-related events. After the case of the arrest of a journalist, as well as due to strong reactions of the society and international actors, the conclusion was withdrawn, but the obstacles to the freedom of media in Serbia have not disappeared. Among them, for example, were temporary Crisis Response Team – held without the presence of the media. The unfavourable state of media freedom was noted in a number of international reports, including the Reporters Without Borders global index.

At the time of the research, several measures aimed to stem the spread of the virus were in force - gatherings of more than five people indoors and outdoors were prohibited, holidays in primary and high schools were extended, and the working hours of catering facilities were limited.

Readers of this report should bear in mind the above described socio-political circumstances while interpreting the results.

## Methodology

The survey “Citizen Participation in Democratic Processes in Serbia” has been conducted by the CARTA every year since 2013. For seven years, the surveys have been conducted in cooperation with the *Ipsos Strategic Marketing Agency* by face-to-face polls, which enabled public opinion monitoring from year to year and subsequent comparing of the results. In 2020, a coronavirus pandemic made it impossible to conduct research by surveying citizens face to face. The CARTA therefore independently conducted the research using the Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system. For the purposes of the research, mobile telephony was used, due to higher coverage of the population in relation to fixed telephony, with random selection of telephone numbers (Random Digit Dialling - RDD). Although the change in the method of data collection did not significantly change the questions themselves (certain questions were corrected to better suit telephone conversations), the length of the questionnaire was halved compared to face-to-face surveys. Given that it is very difficult to assess the impact of changes in the way data is collected on the results, it is important to emphasise that **it is not justified to compare the data from this report with the results of previous research.**

**Data collection method:** Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) with *Random Digit Dialling*

**Target population:** adult citizens of the Republic of Serbia (excluding Kosovo and Metohija)

**Instrument:** questionnaire (47 questions)

**Sample type:** random sample, representative for the Republic of Serbia (excluding Kosovo and Metohija)

**Strata:** total 48, by gender (male, female), age (18-34 years, 35-64 years, 65+ years), region (Belgrade, Vojvodina, Šumadija and Western Serbia, Southern and Eastern Serbia) and type of settlement (urban, rural)

**Poststratification:** by gender, age, region and type of settlement

**Sample:** 1010 respondents

**Margin of error:**  $\pm 3.15\%$

**Response rate:** 22%

**Average test duration:** 13 minutes

**Research period:** November 16<sup>th</sup> to 22<sup>nd</sup> 2020

## Sampling method for digit dialling

There are three operators in Serbia with a total of eight extensions (060, 061, 062, 063, 064, 065, 066, 069). In some extensions there are six-digit and seven-digit numbers (062, 063, 066, 069), while in others only seven-digit ones (060, 061, 064, 065). This means that in 12 different combinations there is a total of 84 million number permutations (80 million for eight seven-digit and four million for four six-digit extensions). To estimate how many active users there are in each of the 12 combinations, a mass SMS service was used that allows to determine how many sent messages were delivered. In the first phase of the research, the CARTA sent 1,000 SMS messages on all 12 combinations, based on which it was estimated that there was a total of 7,786,000 active users, which is close to the RATEL's (Republic Agency for Electronic Communications and Postal Services) estimate of 8,453,887 users<sup>1</sup> (not single users, because there are citizens who have multiple telephone numbers). The distribution of users by operator extensions was: MTS 44.7% (RATEL 44.3%), Telenor 31.7% (RATEL 31.4%), VIP 23.6% (RATEL 24%). Most users use seven-digit 064 numbers - a total of 2,380,000 users, or 31% of the total. The four combinations had a very small number of users, which would mean that a very large number of calls would be required to reach an existing user. For this reason, the six-digit and seven-digit numbers 066 and 069 were excluded. The remaining eight combinations were used in the study, which included 7,064,000 users (91%).

After eliminating these four combinations, the total number of permutations was 62 million (60 million for six seven-digit numbers and two million for two six-digit numbers). Then, a sample of numbers from 62 million was randomly generated, and again, with the help of the system for sending SMS messages, it was determined which numbers were the existing ones. Existing numbers were then added to the calling database. In this way, non-existent numbers were removed and at the same time a random selection of numbers was provided, i.e. of citizens who would have the opportunity to participate in the research. Operators therefore called only existing numbers that were randomly selected from a database of all possible number combinations.

## Data collection procedure

Before the call, a random message was sent to the numbers that had been randomly selected: *“Hello, the computer has randomly selected your number to participate in anonymous and voluntary scientific research. Next week, an interviewer from the CARTA association will call you.”* Owners of numbers who expressed disagreement with further communication in any way were immediately removed from the database.

Calls were made between 9 a.m. and 9 p.m. (on Sundays from 10 a.m. to 8 p.m.). Calls were made by 21 operators, 11 of whom had already had experience in telephone surveys, and all operators underwent training few days before the start of the survey, which included both call testing and surveys. They used calling software and a platform

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<sup>1</sup> [https://www.ratel.rs/uploads/documents/empire\\_plugin/Pregled%20trzista%202019\\_web\\_final.pdf](https://www.ratel.rs/uploads/documents/empire_plugin/Pregled%20trzista%202019_web_final.pdf)

to enter answers. They made the call by clicking on a randomly selected number, and filled in the survey through a conversation with the citizens.

### Sampling and weighting

In order for the sample of respondents to correspond to the population structure of the Republic of Serbia (excluding Kosovo and Metohija), a total of 48 strata were determined that corresponded to the estimated structure based on gender (male, female), age (18-34 years, 35-64 years, 65+ years), region (Belgrade, Vojvodina, Šumadija and Western Serbia, Southern and Eastern Serbia) and type of settlement (urban, rural). Data from the Republic Statistical Office for 2019 were used.

The software randomly chose which number would be called. Anyone who agreed to participate in the research went through an interrogation with the operator, who at the very beginning asked questions on the basis of which the strata had previously been created. The software automatically classified each respondent into one of 48 strata. Only at the end of the research would a stratum be filled (for example, highly educated men from the urban area of Šumadija older than 65), so the operators had to refuse the participation of interested respondents if they belonged to the filled in stratum. Finally, a total of 243 respondents were unable to participate in the study because they belonged to an already completed stratum.

As can be seen in Table 1 below, the final sample has more urban population than the population of Serbia, especially from Belgrade, i.e. it contains slightly fewer citizens older than 65, which deviates from the population characteristics of the Republic of Serbia. In order to match the deviations of the relevant demographic characteristics of the sample with the population, the data were weighted after collection. More specifically, iterative proportional fitting (raking) was used. The results were weighted according to the same, already mentioned strata, so that they correspond to the figures of the Republic Bureau of Statistics for 2019. The weighting did not significantly affect the results. Namely, changes in the estimated answers to various questions due to weighting usually ranged from 1-2%. Based on the above, **the results are representative of the population of the Republic of Serbia (excluding Kosovo and Metohija).**

### Questionnaire

The questions and offered answers were created to match the conversation over the phone. After testing the length of the questionnaire and the clarity of the question on a small number of respondents, it was decided that the survey should not last longer than 15 minutes and based on that the final number of questions was determined.

The questionnaire consisted of 47 questions, mostly closed-ended ones, and four open-ended questions. Some questions were conditional, that is, they would be presented only if the person had given a certain answer to the previous question. In other words, not all respondents answered all 47 questions. Among the given answers there was an option for respondents who do not know how to answer the question or who do not want to answer - **does not know / no answer (DK/NA)**. The order of the offered answers in the questions was random, except in cases when the offered answers were from the Likert scale (for example, in the range from *I do not agree at all* to *I completely agree*). The questionnaire contained seven socio-demographic questions related to: gender, age, education, region, type of settlement, financial status and employment status. The topics covered in the questionnaire, in addition to socio-demographic characteristics were:

- Interest in political topics (7 questions)
- Participation in democratic processes (12 questions)
- Satisfaction with the work of the Government and the Assembly (6 questions)
- Political views (5 questions)
- Elections (5 questions)
- Media (5 questions)

### **Statistics of the data collection process**

A total of 1,010 surveys were completed, while 3,600 citizens refused to participate in the survey. The response rate was therefore 22%. In other words, approximately one in five citizens we called on the phone agreed to participate in the survey.

*Remark:* When reading reports and charts, one should keep in mind that percentages will not always add up to 100 due to rounding numbers. The report presents descriptive statistics, and to test the differences between demographic groups, Cramér's V was used instead of the Chi-square, which is biased on large samples. This measure is used to determine the relationship between two categorical variables and ranges from 0 to 1 (maximum possible correlation). **Before crossing the answers to two different questions**, respondents who answered "I don't know" or did not provide an answer to the question were removed from the analysis, if the number of such cases was small. For example, when the answers to the question "How interested are you in the negotiations between Belgrade and Priština?" were crossed with socio-demographic variables, the analysis was conducted after excluding respondents who did not provide an answer or who said they did not know (in total 3%). On the other hand, when citizens answered the question regarding whether there is someone in their place who works on solving citizens' problems, a significantly larger number opted for the DK/NA option (34%), so they were also included in analysis when comparing with socio-demographic variables.

## Sample description

Table 1.  
*Sample description*

		Unweighted %	Weighted %
Gender	Male	52	49
	Female	48	51
Age	18-34	25	24
	35-64	55	51
	65+	19	24
Region	Beograd	28	23
	Vojvodina	25	26
	Šumadija and Western Serbia	27	29
	Southern and Eastern Serbia	20	22
Type of settlement	Urban	70	60
	Rural	30	40
Education	Unfinished or completed primary school (PS)		12
	High school (HS)		50
	Higher school of university (UE)		38
Financial situation	I do not have enough money, often not even for food		6
	I have enough for food, but I can hardly buy clothes		15
	I have enough money for food and clothes, but not for larger purchases, such as a TV or refrigerator		41
	I also have money for larger purchases, such as a TV or refrigerator		28
	I can buy almost anything I want		8
Employment status	Permanent placements; work in one's own company, or self-employed		34
	Temporary employees, employed through umbrella companies		11
	Work without an employment contract or without a written contract		3
	Work on one's own estate		3
	Housewives		5
	Pensioners		25
	Pupils or students		5
	Unemployed		12
Political inclination*	More inclined to ruling parties		31
	More inclined to opposition parties		8
	Neither one nor the other		56

\* The question was: "Are you more inclined to ruling political parties, to those that are in opposition or to neither?"

Table 2.  
*Crossing of socio-demographic characteristics (%)*

	18-34	35-64	65+	PS	HS	UE	Beograd	Vojvodina	Šumadija and Western Serbia	Southern and Eastern Serbia	Urban	Rural
Male	12	25	12	5	27	17	11	12	15	12	27	22
Female	12	27	12	7	23	21	12	14	14	10	33	18
18-34				2	14	9	6	6	7	6	15	10
35-64				5	26	20	11	15	15	11	30	22
65+				5	10	9	7	5	8	5	16	8
PS							2	3	3	4	5	7
HS							9	15	17	10	26	24
UE							12	8	10	8	29	9

## Summary of key findings

### Interest in political topics

The results show that the citizens of Serbia are, on average, moderately interested in politics in their country. Slightly more than one third of citizens are either completely uninterested or little interested in politics, and there are as many who are quite or very interested. Citizens are more interested in the work and organisation of the local self-government than in the work and organisation of the National Assembly of Serbia. The least interest is shown in the programmes of political parties, in which as many as 44% of citizens are not interested at all, as well as in non-governmental organisations, in the work of which 36% of people are not interested at all. When it comes to foreign policy issues, a larger number of citizens are interested in the course of negotiations between Belgrade and Priština than in accession negotiations with the European Union.

Citizens over the age of 65 are most interested in specific topics such as the work of the Assembly, the programmes of political parties and the negotiations between Belgrade and Priština. Respondents over the age of 35 are significantly more interested in EU negotiations, while the youngest (18-34) are somewhat more interested in the work of non-governmental organisations. Differences in age do not exist only in terms of interest in local self-government.

More specifically, citizens over the age of 65, those with higher or university education and those living in urban areas are most interested in politics. In addition, citizens who have political preferences are more interested in politics, i.e. they lean either towards governing parties or towards opposition parties in comparison to the citizens who do not lean to either side.

Citizens who are over 65 and who are more inclined to the governing parties are significantly more interested in the work of the Assembly and the negotiations between Belgrade and Priština. Besides, citizens whose political inclinations more inclined to opposition are the least interested in the Assembly, even less than undecided citizens.

Citizens who are more inclined to the governing parties are significantly more interested in the work and organisation of local self-government than those who are more inclined to opposition parties or who are undecided.

Citizens over the age of 65 who have a political inclination towards either the ruling parties or the opposition parties are significantly more interested in the programmes of political parties.

Citizens over the age of 35, who have graduated from higher school or university, who live in an urban settlement and who are opposition-oriented are more interested in negotiations with the European Union. One half of the citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties are quite or very interested in negotiations with the EU, compared to one third of the citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties.

The youngest respondents (18-34), the most educated and those who are more inclined to opposition parties are more interested in the work of non-governmental organisations.

There are no differences between men and women in terms of interest in different political topics, nor between citizens living in different regions.

Table 3 summarises the results of crossings with socio-demographic characteristics of the population.

Table 3.

*Interest in political topics in relation to socio-demographic characteristics*

	Age	Educa- tion	Type of settlement	Political inclination
Politics	65+	UE	rural	ruling parties or opposition
Work of the Assembly	65+			ruling parties
Local self-government				ruling parties
Parties' programmes	65+			ruling parties or opposition
BG-Priština	65+			ruling parties
EU negotiations	35+	UE	urban	opposition
Work of NGOs	18-34	UE		opposition

*Remark no. 1:* The table shows groups that are most interested in certain political topics, i.e. significantly more interested than groups that are not in the table.

*Remark no. 2:* Weak correlations are highlighted in yellow (V between 0.07 and 0.12), Moderate correlations are highlighted in green (V between 0.12 and 0.2), Strong correlations are highlighted in blue (V between 0.20 and 0.48)

### Citizen participation in democratic processes

One third of the citizens state that in their town, there is someone who solves their problems. Out of citizens who think that there is someone who solves problems, the largest number of them pinpoints the municipality i.e. the local self-government unit (65%). About 28% of citizens believe that this is done by political movements or citizens who organise themselves, while 25% believe that problems are solved by individuals who are directly, personally concerned. The smallest number of respondents think that non-governmental organisations are working to solve problems (11%).

At the same time, one third of the citizens point out that there is no one who works on solving the citizens' problems. Significantly more people from Belgrade, Šumadija, Eastern and Western Serbia think that there is no one who works to solve their problems (34-39%) than in Vojvodina (26%).

When it comes to participation in democratic processes, citizens do not have much confidence that their personal engagement, i.e. involvement in the democratic process will enable them to influence changes in their country. The only activity that a slightly larger number of citizens believe can contribute to a change is the exercise of the right to vote - about 50% of citizens believe that they can influence change by voting in

parliamentary or local elections. In addition, about one-third of respondents think that change can be influenced by drawing media attention to citizens' problems. On the other hand, most citizens think that they cannot overly influence a change by joining a political party, participating in demonstrations, connecting with non-governmental organisations, organising actions online or contacting members of the Assembly.

Citizens over the age of 65 and those closer to ruling parties think they can influence change to a greater extent by voting in parliamentary and local elections. The least educated citizens think that change can be influenced by voting in parliamentary elections to a greater extent, while those living in rural areas think that they can influence change to a greater extent by voting in local elections than respondents from urban areas.

The possibility of influencing change by joining a political party is to a greater extent acknowledged by citizens who are of legal age but under 35, and who are politically inclined to governing parties. The youngest citizens (18-34 years old), those who have graduated from higher school or university, who live either in Belgrade or in Southern or Eastern Serbia, and especially those who are inclined to the opposition parties think that demonstrations are a good way to influence change in the situation in the country.

The youngest and most educated citizens, as well as those who incline to opposition parties, emphasise that they can influence the change of things by contacting the media, through actions on the Internet and by connecting with non-governmental organisations. Women are slightly more inclined to connecting to non-governmental organisations than men, as well as respondents from urban areas compared to those living in rural areas. Citizens who are more inclined to parties in power think that contacting MPs can influence changes in our country more than those who are more inclined to opposition parties or those who are not close to either the ruling parties or the opposition parties.

Table 4.

*Possibility of influencing change in relation to socio-demographic characteristics*

Activity type	Gender	Age	Educa- tion	Region	Settle- ment	Political inclination
Voting in parliam elect.		65+	PS			ruling parties
Voting in local elect.		65+			rural	ruling parties
Joining a polit. party		18-34				ruling parties
Demonstrations		18-34	UE	BG & SE		opposition
Contacting media		18-34	UE			opposition
Connecting with NGOs	F	18-34	UE		urban	opposition
Actions on the Internet		18-34	UE			opposition
Contacting MPs						ruling parties

Remark no. 1: The table shows groups that think that they can influence the changes significantly more than groups that are not in the table

Remark no. 2: Weak correlations are highlighted in yellow (V between 0.07 and 0.12), moderate correlations are highlighted in green (V between 0.12 and 0.2), strong correlations are highlighted in blue (V between 0.20 and 0.48)

When it comes to participation in initiatives, about two thirds of citizens did not participate last year in any action or initiative aiming to solve a problem in the local community. Out of those citizens, the largest number state that the reason for non-participation is that they do not believe that something can be achieved (32%), and that they do not have time for this type of engagement (29%). About 18% of citizens point out that they do not know how to do it, while 13% of citizens are not interested in such engagement.

Some form of action was initiated independently by 11% of citizens, while a slightly higher percentage participated in initiatives (20%), with men initiating initiatives more often than women. In addition, citizens who graduated from higher school or university most often initiated actions or participated in them, while the least educated citizens were the least likely to initiate and participate in actions.

## Political views

Slightly less than one half of the population (47%) thinks that democracy is the best political system for our country, that is, they state that they mostly or completely agree with that statement. As many as 22% are undecided - neither agree nor disagree, while one quarter (24%) either mostly or completely disagree with the statement that democracy is the best political system for our country. About one half of the citizens (51%) agree with the statement that our country needs a strong leader and a “firm hand” that could lead us out of the crisis. About one third (35%) generally or completely disagree with this, while 11% are undecided. So, in relation to the question of democracy where as many as 22% are undecided, the attitude about a strong leader is much more polarised amongst the population.

The democratic system is significantly more supported by citizens who are over 65 and who are more inclined to opposition parties, while democracy has the least support among adult citizens who are under 35, as well as among citizens who are politically undecided, i.e. neither inclined to ruling parties nor to opposition parties.

A strong leader and a “firm hand” are mostly supported by women, respondents over the age of 65, citizens living outside Belgrade, those living in rural settlements, as well as citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties. As many as two thirds of citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties completely agree with the statement that it would be best for Serbia to have one strong leader that everyone would obey, while only 12% of citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties completely agree with that.

When it comes to foreign policy attitudes, one third of citizens would be happy if Serbia joined the European Union, and there are just as many who would be happy if Serbia gave up the EU and formed an alliance with Russia or China. Regarding these two issues, citizens are mostly indifferent, i.e. 43% are indifferent about joining the EU, and 38% about forming an alliance with Russia or China. On the other hand, almost twice as many citizens would be indifferent if Serbia recognised the independence of Kosovo (23%),

while only 4% of them would be happy, and two thirds of citizens would be worried (68%).

The most educated citizens would be the happiest and the least worried about the accession to the European Union, as well as those who live in urban settlements and citizens who are more inclined to political options in the opposition. At the same time, those with higher or university education, as well as citizens who are closer to opposition parties, are the least indifferent to this topic, while citizens from rural and urban settlements are equally indifferent (46%).

If, on the other hand, the accession to the EU were to be abandoned and an alliance with Russia or China formed, that would make men the happiest, as well as citizens over the age of 65, the least educated ones, those living in rural areas and those closer to the ruling parties. As far as this issue is concerned, women are significantly more indifferent than men, and so are citizens between the ages of 35 and 64, those living in urban areas, and citizens who are not close to either the ruling parties or the opposition parties.

When it comes to the attitude towards the potential recognition of Kosovo's independence, the biggest difference between citizens of different socio-demographic characteristics is in terms of how worried and indifferent they would be. Citizens over the age of 65 would be significantly more worried, and at the same time would be less indifferent than younger respondents. Citizens more inclined to ruling parties would also be significantly more worried, and less indifferent (83%); the undecided would be less worried (68%), while the least worried would be citizens who are closer to opposition parties (56%), of whom 40% would be indifferent.

Table 5.

*Political attitudes in relation to socio-demographic characteristics*

Attitude	Gender	Age	Educa- tion	Region	Settle- ment	Political inclination
Democracy		65+				opposition
"Firm hand"	F	65+	PS	Out of BG	rural	ruling parties
EU accession			UE		urban	opposition
Alliance with Russia/China	M	65+	PS		rural	ruling parties
Kosovo independence		< 65				opposition

*Remark no. 1:* The table shows groups that have significantly more positive attitudes than groups that are not in the table.

*Remark no. 2:* Weak correlations are highlighted in yellow (V between 0.07 and 0.12), moderate correlations are highlighted in green (V between 0.12 and 0.2), strong correlations are highlighted in blue (V between 0.20 and 0.48)

## Satisfaction with the work of the Government and the Assembly

Citizens are more dissatisfied than satisfied with the work of the previous Government of Serbia (2017-2020). Slightly less than one third of citizens (30%) are not satisfied with the work of the Government at all, while 18% are completely satisfied. Women are more satisfied with the work of the Government than men, citizens older than 65 are more satisfied than those younger than 65. Those who have completed only primary school are more satisfied than citizens who are better educated, the population from rural areas is also more satisfied with the Government than the urban one. In addition, citizens who are more inclined to governing parties are significantly more satisfied than those who are undecided or who incline towards the opposition - among the latter, no citizen indicated that they were completely satisfied, while only 3% were mostly satisfied.

As in the case of the Government of Serbia, citizens are more dissatisfied than satisfied with the work of the National Assembly. One third of citizens (31%) are not satisfied at all, while twice as many citizens (14%) are completely satisfied with the work of the Assembly. The most satisfied with the work of the Assembly are the oldest citizens (65+ years old), those who have completed only primary school at most, who live in a rural settlement and who are politically closer to ruling parties. In general, the least educated citizens, those from rural areas, as well as citizens who are politically inclined to ruling parties, are most satisfied with the work of the Government and the work of the Assembly.

Regarding the specific activities and roles of the Assembly and MPs, citizens are in general critically-oriented. Namely, 44% of citizens do not think that the Assembly effectively monitors the work of the Government or that the Government pursues an accountable policy for the good of all citizens, while 20% of citizens neither agree nor disagree. Citizens evaluate the work of MPs even more negatively. Two thirds of the citizens generally or completely agree that the MPs care more about the interests of their political parties than about the interests of the citizens, and 58% of them think that the MPs are ruining the reputation of the Assembly with their behaviour. Moreover, only 18% of citizens generally or completely agree that MPs are available to citizens who want to contact them.

Citizens who are more inclined to governing parties and who have completed primary school at most evaluate the work of the Assembly and MPs much more positively. Undecided citizens, who are not close to either opposition parties or ruling parties, have attitudes that are closer to opposition-minded citizens, i.e. they are more critical of the work of the Assembly and MPs. The efficiency in overseeing the Government is also assessed more positively by women over the age of 65, citizens from Southern or Eastern Serbia and those living in rural areas. The oldest citizens (65+), those who live in Southern or Eastern Serbia, as well as citizens from rural areas, point out that MPs are available to citizens who want to contact them to a greater extent. Besides, citizens living in rural areas, as well as the youngest and oldest citizens, are less likely to think

that MPs are tarnishing the reputation of the Assembly than respondents from urban areas and middle-aged citizens. (35-64).

Table 6.  
*Evaluation of the work of the Government and the Assembly in relation to socio-demographic characteristics*

Type of activity	Gender	Age	Educa- tion	Region	Settle- ment	Political inclination
Work of the Government	F	65+	PS	SE	rural	ruling parties
Work of the Assembly		65+	PS		rural	ruling parties
Government oversight	F	65+	PS	SE	rural	ruling parties
Availability of MPs		65+	PS	SE	rural	ruling parties
Concern for interests			PS			ruling parties
Reputation tarnishing		18-34, 65+	PS		rural	ruling parties

*Remark no. 1:* The table shows groups that evaluate the work of the Government and the Assembly significantly more positively than groups that are not in the table.

*Remark no. 2:* Weak correlations are highlighted in yellow (V between 0.07 and 0.12), moderate correlations are highlighted in green (V between 0.12 and 0.2), strong correlations are highlighted in blue (V between 0.20 and 0.48)

## Elections

Slightly more than one half of the citizens (55%) point out that they would certainly go to the polls if the elections were held that week, while 12% would probably vote. In addition, 22% of citizens would certainly not vote. The intention to vote differs significantly in relation to some socio-demographic characteristics, so the greatest intention to vote is shown by citizens over 65, by those who live in rural areas, as well as by citizens who are inclined to ruling parties.

As the most common motive for going to the polls, citizens state a sense of duty (44%), then a desire to influence the policy that will be implemented in Serbia (32%), while the reason most rarely brought up is giving support to a party close to them and to its leader (16 %). The oldest citizens (65+) vote much more often than the younger ones in the elections in order to support the party that is close to them and the leader of that party. Citizens with the lowest education also more often quote this reason as the main motive for going to the polls than citizens who have completed at least high school. On the other hand, those with higher or university education stated to a much greater extent that their main motive was to use their vote to influence the policy that would be implemented in Serbia. Those living in urban areas were more likely than rural population to vote because they wanted to influence the policies to be pursued in Serbia, and less likely than rural population to vote because they wanted to support a close party and its leader. Citizens who are more inclined to ruling party are significantly more likely than others to vote to support the party and the leader, while citizens who

are more inclined to opposition parties are mostly voting to influence the policy pursued in Serbia. Citizens who are not close to either ruling parties or opposition parties vote more than others because they feel it is their civic duty.

Table 7.

*Motive for voting in elections in relation to socio-demographic characteristics*

	Age	Education	Settle- ment	Political inclination
Civic duty		PS & HS		undecided
Influence on policies		UE	urban	opposition
Support to a party and its leader	65+	PS	rural	ruling parties

*Remark no. 1:* The table shows groups that significantly more often emphasised the stated motive for going to the polls

*Remark no. 2:* Weak correlations are highlighted in yellow (V between 0.07 and 0.12), moderate correlations are highlighted in green (V between 0.12 and 0.2), strong correlations are highlighted in blue (V between 0.20 and 0.48)

As the most common reason for not going to the polls, citizens state that they do not trust that any party will fulfil its pre-election promises (27%). Between 12 and 16% of citizens quoted various reasons, for example they think that their vote will not change anything, that there is no political option they agree with, that electoral conditions are not the same for all participants or that they are not interested in politics at all. The youngest respondents (18-34) stated to a much greater extent than the older ones that they do not go to the polls because they are not interested in politics at all. Those between the ages of 35 and 64 point out significantly more often that they do not vote because there is no political option that they agree with, while the oldest (65+) point out to a much greater extent than the younger ones that they do not go to the polls for some other reasons. Those who have at least finished high school state to a much greater extent that they do not go to the polls because they do not trust that any party will fulfil its promises. On the other hand, citizens who have completed primary school at most are much more likely to state that they would not vote because they are not interested in politics or for some other reason that is not offered in the questionnaire. Also, the most educated ones point out to a much greater extent than the less educated as the main reason for not voting that there is no political option that they agree with. Two thirds of the citizens (64%) who are more inclined to opposition parties point out that the main reason they would not vote is that the election conditions are not the same for all participants. Those who are more inclined to ruling parties, on the other hand, point out to a much greater extent that they would not vote because they think that their vote will not change anything or for some other reason that is not stated. The undecided would mostly not vote because they do not trust that any party will fulfil its promises or because there is no political option that they agree with.

Table 8.  
The reason for not voting in the elections in relation to socio-demographic characteristics

	Age	Educa- tion	Political inclination
Distrust that the parties will fulfil their promises		HE & UE	undecided
They are not interested in politics	18-34	PS	
Inequality of electoral conditions			opposition
Their vote will not change anything			ruling parties
There is no party that they agree with	35-64	UE	undecided
Other	65+	PS	ruling parties

Remark no. 1: The table shows groups that significantly more often emphasised the stated motive for not going to the polls

Remark no. 2: Moderate correlations are highlighted in green (V between 0.12 and 0.2), Strong correlations are highlighted in blue (V between 0.20 and 0.48)

## Media

In order to be informed about political and social topics, the largest number of citizens use television and radio (65%), followed by internet portals (48%), social networks (43%) or get information through conversations with family and friends (42%). In addition, a quarter of citizens are informed by reading newspapers (26%).

Specifically, one quarter of citizens are informed through the Radio Television of Serbia, 15% on the Pink channel, 11% on the First Serbian Television, and 10% on N1 television. Internet portals that citizens mostly use for information are Blic (6%), N1 (5%) and Kurir (3%), while among the daily newspapers the most represented ones are Blic, Večernje novosti and Informer, which are read by 5% of Serbian citizens.

Almost one half of citizens think that the media in Serbia are under significant political pressure (46%), a quarter believe that there is occasional pressure on the media, but that media freedom is not jeopardised (26%), while only 21% of citizens believe that the media in Serbia are free and independent of political influences. Men, citizens under the age of 65, those who have completed higher school or university, as well as citizens who are closer to opposition parties are more likely to think that the media are under significant media pressure - 86% of those who think so.

Table 9.  
Assessment of media freedom in relation to socio-demographic characteristics

	Gender	Age	Education	Political inclination
Media freedom	F	65+	PS	ruling parties

Remark no. 1: The table shows the groups that which assess media freedom much more positively.

Remark no. 2: Weak correlations are highlighted in yellow (V between 0.07 and 0.12), strong correlations are highlighted in blue (V between 0.20 and 0.48)

## Research results

### 1. Interest in political topics

**A quarter of the citizens of the Republic of Serbia are not interested in politics in their country at all (27%).** About 36% of citizens are only slightly or moderately interested, and approximately the same number of citizens are quite or very interested (37%).

**When it comes to specific topics, the citizens of Serbia are most interested in the work and organisation of local self-government.** Almost one half of the citizens (47%) are quite or very interested in how the place where they live is managed. **Another topic that a large number of citizens are interested in is the course of negotiations between Belgrade and Priština.** About 44% of citizens are quite or very interested in this topic. The number of people who pointed out their interest in other topics is significantly lower, with the least interest in the work of non-governmental organisations and interest in the programmes of political parties, in which only one fifth of citizens are quite or very interested. As many as 44% of citizens pointed out that they were not interested in the programmes of political parties at all, while 15% said that they were not interested in this topic. Slightly more than one half of the citizens (54%) are either little or not interested in the work of non-governmental organisations. One third of citizens are also completely uninterested in the work and organisation of the Serbian Parliament (32%), as well as in the EU integration. (32%).

#### How interested are you in the following topics?



Chart 1. Interest in political topics

## Interest in politics in Serbia

Interest in politics differs significantly in relation to age ( $V = .163, p < .001$ ), education ( $V = .110, p < .01$ ), type of settlement ( $V = .116, p < .01$ ), as well as and in relation to political inclination of the citizens ( $V = .217, p < .001$ ). There are no differences in relation to gender and the region in which citizens live.

**The oldest citizens are much more interested in politics in Serbia than middle-aged and youngest citizens.** The interest of middle-aged respondents (35-64 years) in this topic is at the same time less than the interest of the oldest (more than 65 years), but also significantly higher in relation to the youngest citizens (18-34 years). There is a particularly big difference in the interest of the oldest and youngest groups of citizens. More specifically, 50% of citizens from the oldest group point out that they are quite or very interested in politics, while only 29% of the youngest gave such an answer. Moreover, 21% of the oldest citizens are not interested in this topic at all, while the same is stated by as many as one third of the youngest citizens (35%). From the group of middle-aged citizens, 35% of them are quite or very interested in politics in their country, and 26% are not interested at all.




Chart 2. Interest in politics in relation to age

**Citizens who have higher or university education are more interested in politics in Serbia than citizens who have completed only primary or high school.** From the group of the most educated, 44% of citizens are quite or very interested in politics, which is significantly more in comparison to a group of citizens who have completed only high school (32%) or primary school (36%). Likewise, among citizens with higher or university education, only 20% stated that they were not interested in politics at all - significantly less than citizens with lower education.

How interested are you in politics in Serbia?  
- crossed with education -




Chart 3. Interest in politics in relation to education

**Respondents from urban settlements are somewhat more interested in politics than people living in rural areas.** Namely, one third of citizens from rural areas are not interested in politics at all, while the same is stated by 23% of citizens living in cities. In addition, there are slightly more people who are much interested in politics in urban areas than respondents from rural areas.

How interested are you in politics in Serbia?  
- crossed with the type of settlement -




Chart 4. Interest in politics in relation to type of settlement

**Citizens who are not close to either ruling parties or opposition parties are significantly less interested in politics in Serbia than those who are inclined to ruling or opposition parties.** Only 28% of undecided citizens are quite or very interested, compared to just over half of those close to ruling or opposition parties.




Chart 5. Interest in politics in relation to political inclination

### Interest in the work and organisation of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia

Interest in the work and organisation of the National Assembly differs significantly in relation to age of citizens ( $V = .150, p < .001$ ) and political inclination ( $V = .238, p < .001$ ). **Citizens over the age of 65 and those closer to ruling party are significantly more interested in the work and organisation of the Assembly** than middle-aged and youngest respondents, those who are inclined to opposition parties or are undecided.

More precisely, nearly one half of the oldest respondents point out that they are quite or very interested in this topic, while 29% of middle-aged and only 22% of the youngest share this view. The difference in interest is most striking between the oldest and the youngest citizens. Namely, 23% of the oldest state that they are not interested in the work and organisation of the Assembly at all, and this is pointed out by as many as 38% of adult citizens who are less than 35 years old.

### How interested are you in the work and organisation of the Serbian Assembly?

- crossed with age -




Chart 6. Interest in the work and organisation of the Assembly in relation to age

One half of the citizens who are more inclined to the ruling parties are quite or very interested in the work and organisation of the Assembly, which is significantly more than the respondents who are more inclined to opposition parties (25%) or those who are undecided (22%). In addition, citizens who are more inclined to opposition are somewhat less interested in the Assembly than undecided.

### How interested are you in the work and organisation of the Serbian Assembly?

- crossed with political inclination -




Chart 7. Interest in the work and organisation of the Assembly in relation to political inclination

### Interest in the work and organisation of local self-government

Interest in the work and organisation of local self-government differs significantly in relation to the political inclination of citizens ( $V = .168, p < .001$ ). Namely, **citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties are significantly more interested in the work of local self-government** than those who are more inclined to opposition parties or those who are undecided - among whom there is no difference. Almost two thirds of those who are more inclined to ruling parties (64%) are quite or very interested in this topic, compared to about 40% of the rest. There is no difference between citizens who are undecided and those who are more inclined to opposition parties in terms of interest in the work of local self-government.




Chart 8. Interest in the work and organisation of local self-government in relation to political inclination

### Interest in political parties' programmes

Interest in political parties' programmes differs significantly in relation to age ( $V = .124, p < .001$ ) and political inclination of citizens ( $V = .195, p < .001$ ). **The oldest citizens are more interested in political parties' programmes than the middle-aged and the youngest.**

One third of citizens over the age of 65 are quite or very interested in political parties' programmes, which is significantly more than the middle-aged (20%) and the youngest (13%). One half of the youngest citizens (52%) are not interested in this topic at all, compared to 38% of the oldest and 44% of middle-aged citizens.

How interested are you in political parties' programmes ?  
- crossed with age -




Chart 9. Interest in political parties' programmes in relation to age

**Citizens who are inclined to ruling or opposition parties are significantly more interested in political parties' programmes** than undecided citizens. Roughly twice as many decided than undecided citizens are quite or very interested in this topic.

How interested are you political parties' programmes?  
- crossed with political inclination -




Chart 10. Interest in political parties' programmes in relation to political inclination

### Interest in the course of negotiations between Belgrade and Priština

There is a significant difference between all three age groups when it comes to interest in the course of negotiations between Belgrade and Priština ( $V = .167, p < .001$ ), and there are also differences in relation to the political inclination of citizens ( $V = .198, p < .001$ ).

**The negotiations between Belgrade and Priština are of most interest to citizens over the age of 65, while adult citizens under the age of 35 are least interested.** This difference is most pronounced when comparing the youngest and oldest groups of citizens. Two thirds of citizens over the age of 65 are quite or very interested in this topic, compared to one third of citizens from the youngest age group.




Chart 11. Interest in the course of negotiations between Belgrade and Priština in relation to age

**Two thirds of citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties are quite or very interested in the course of negotiations between Belgrade and Priština (64%),** compared to one third of those who are more inclined to opposition parties (35%) and one third of undecided respondents (36%).




Chart 12. Interest in the course of negotiations between Belgrade and Priština in relation to political inclination

### Interest in accession negotiations with the European Union

Interest in accession negotiations with the European Union differs significantly in relation to age ( $V = .131, p < .001$ ), education ( $V = .126, p < .001$ ), type of settlement ( $V = .108, p < .05$ ), as well as the political inclinations of the citizens ( $V = .131, p < .001$ ).

**Adult citizens under the age of 35 are significantly less interested in accession negotiations with the EU compared to older age groups.** Almost one half (45%) of the youngest age group are not interested at all, compared to 31% of middle-aged and 23% of the oldest respondents.




Chart 13. Interest in accession negotiations with the EU in relation to age

**The most educated citizens are more interested in accession negotiations with the EU than citizens who have completed high school or primary school.** As many as 61% of citizens who have completed primary school at most have little or no interest in this topic, compared to 50% of citizens who have completed high school, or 41% of those who have higher or university education.

How interested are you in the accession negotiations with the EU?  
- crossed with education -




Chart 14. Interest in accession negotiations with the EU in relation to education

**Citizens from urban areas are somewhat more interested in accession negotiations with the EU than citizens from rural areas.** One third of citizens from urban areas are quite or very interested in this topic, compared to 26% of citizens from rural areas. There is also a slightly higher number of people from rural areas who pointed out that they are not interested in this topic at all (36%), in comparison to citizens living in cities (30%).

How interested are you in the accession negotiations with the EU?  
- crossed with the type of settlement -




Chart 15. Interest in accession negotiations with the EU in relation to the type of settlement

Undecided citizens, who are neither for the ruling parties nor for the opposition, are the least interested in negotiations with the EU, while those who are more inclined to opposition parties are most interested. As many as one half of the citizens who are more inclined to the opposition parties are quite or very interested in negotiations with the EU, compared to a **third of the citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties.**

How interested are you in the accession negotiations with the EU?  
- crossed with political inclination -




Chart 16. Interest in accession negotiations with the EU in relation to political inclination

### Interest in the work of non-governmental organisations

Interest in the work of non-governmental organisations differs significantly in relation to age ( $V = .095, p < .05$ ), education ( $V = .104, p < .01$ ) and political inclination of citizens ( $V = .101, p < .05$ ).

**When it comes to age, the least uninterested in the work of non-governmental organisations are among younger respondents.** The most uninterested are among citizens who are over 65 years old. All three age groups, however, emphasised almost to the same extent that they were interested in this topic quite or a lot, so perhaps the most correct conclusion would be that there is no significant difference between these three groups (although it is statistically significant).

How interested are you in the work of non-governmental organisations?  
- crossed with age -




Chart 17. Interest in the work of non-governmental organisations in relation to age

**Citizens with higher or university education are more interested in the work of non-governmental organisations.** There is no difference between citizens who have completed primary school at most and those who have completed high school in terms of interest in the work of non-governmental organisations. Although these differences exist, it should be noted that the interest of citizens in this topic is generally quite low, so it cannot be said that any of the citizens from these groups are particularly interested in the work of NGOs.




Chart 18. Interest in the work of non-governmental organisations in relation to education

**Citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties are significantly more interested in the work of non-governmental organisations** than those who are undecided and those who are more inclined to ruling parties. One third of citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties are quite or very interested in this topic, in comparison to less than 20% of all others.




Chart 19. Interest in the work of non-governmental organisations in relation to political inclination

## 2. Participation in democratic processes

Citizen participation in democratic processes was examined through a series of questions related to the perception of problem solving in the local community. Respondents also answered questions about participating in or launching initiatives at the local level, as well as about the ways in which they can personally influence change. Those who did not initiate or participate in the initiatives also stated the reason why.

### Solving citizens' problems

**One third of the respondents state that in their town there is someone who works on solving citizens' problems (32%), and there is a similar number of those who point out that no one is working on problem solving (34%).** One third of the citizens pointed out that they did not know or did not at all give an answer to this question.

Is there anyone in your town who works to solve citizens' problems?




Chart 20. Is there anyone who works to solve citizens' problems

Citizens' answers to the question of whether there is someone in their town who solves citizens' problems differ significantly in relation to the region ( $V = .092, p < .01$ ) and the type of settlement ( $V = .110, p < .01$ ) in which they live.

**Citizens living in Belgrade point out to a lesser extent that there is someone in their city who solves problems (26%) than citizens from other parts of Serbia (32-35%).** In addition, citizens outside Vojvodina stated to a greater extent that there is no one who works to solve problems (34-39%), compared to those who live in Vojvodina (26%).

Is there anyone in your town who works to solve citizens' problems?  
- crossed with the region -




Chart 21. Is there anyone who solves the citizens' problems? (in relation to the region)

The number of people who said "yes" is similar in urban and rural areas. The difference is primarily reflected in the fact that respondents from rural areas largely pointed out that there is no one who works to solve the problems of citizens, while respondents from urban areas more often pointed out that they do not know or did not give an answer ( $V = 110, p < .01$ ).

Is there anyone in your town who works to solve citizens' problems?  
- crossed with the type of settlement -




Chart 22. Is there anyone who solves the citizens' problems? (in relation to the type of settlement)

Citizens who answered “Yes” to the previous question, i.e. who pointed out that there was someone in their town who solves problems, we asked who that entity in their town is. **Most of them point out that it is a municipality, i.e. local self-government (65%), and the smallest number said that it was non-governmental organisations (11%).** About one quarter of the citizens stated that these are political movements or citizens who organise themselves or individuals when the problem is personally related.




Chart 23. Who works to solve citizens' problems (% out of those who said “Yes”)

### Possibility to influence change

We asked citizens to what extent they think they can influence change performing certain activities. **The largest number of citizens, almost one half (48%), believe that they can have quite a lot or a lot of influence by voting in republic or local elections.** About a third of citizens believe that they can influence quite a lot or a lot by drawing media attention to citizens' problems (32%). When it comes to other ways of influencing change, citizens are much more sceptical. For example, more than one half of citizens think that they cannot influence change at all by contacting members of parliament (57%), participating in demonstrations and protests (56%) or joining a political party (55%). Besides, **nearly one half of the citizens of Serbia believe that they cannot influence change at all by connecting with non-governmental organisations (49%).**

### How much do you think you can influence the change of things with the following activities?




Chart 24. Possibility to influence change through various activities

#### Possibility to influence changes by voting in parliamentary elections

Citizens' perception of how much they can influence changes by voting in parliamentary elections differs significantly in relation to age category they belong to ( $V = .139, p < .001$ ), their educational level ( $V = .114, p < .01$ ) and their political inclination ( $V = .241, p < .001$ ).

**Almost two thirds of citizens over the age of 65 (63%) quite or much agree with this statement compared to 41% of the youngest and 46% of middle-aged citizens.** Likewise, people under the age of 65 think that they cannot influence change at all by voting in parliamentary elections in comparison to people over the age of 65 who think that they can influence change.

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by voting in the parliamentary elections?  
- crossed with age -




Chart 25. Influencing change by voting in parliamentary elections in relation to age

**Almost one half of the citizens of Serbia having completed only primary school think that voting in the parliamentary elections can greatly influence change (46%),** which is significantly more in comparison to more educated respondents, i.e. those with a high school diploma (31%) and those with a higher school or university degree (25%).

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by voting in the parliamentary elections?  
- crossed with education -




Chart 26. Influencing change by voting in parliamentary elections in relation to education

**Those who are more inclined to ruling parties believe that they can influence change by voting in the parliamentary elections,** while those who are undecided think so the least. About 50% of those who are more inclined to ruling parties think that they can have a lot of influence in this way, while one third of citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties (32%), or only 20% of undecided think so.

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by voting in the parliamentary elections?  
- crossed with education -




Chart 27. Influencing changes by voting in parliamentary elections in relation to political inclination

### Possibility to influence change by voting in local elections

Citizens’ perceptions of how much they can influence change by voting in local elections differ significantly in relation to the age category to which they belong ( $V = .100, p < .05$ ), as well as in relation to the type of settlement ( $V = .104, p < .05$ ) and political inclinations ( $V = .220, p < .001$ ). **The oldest citizens to a greater extent point out that they can influence change by voting in the local elections.** About 57% of citizens over the age of 65 point out that it is possible to change things quite or a lot in this way, while less than half of middle-aged and youngest people think the same (47%). This difference is mostly reflected in the fact that as many as 40% of the oldest think that they can greatly influence changes in this way, in comparison to 30% of middle-aged and only 24% of the youngest respondents.

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our state by voting in the local elections for the assembly of your town?  
- crossed with age -




Chart 28. Influencing change by voting in local elections in relation to age

**A slightly higher number of citizens living in rural areas believe that it is possible to influence change very much by voting in local elections (37%)** in comparison to respondents living in urban settlements (27%). At the same time, people from cities were somewhat more likely to say that they quite agree with this statement than those living in rural areas.

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our state by voting in the local elections for the assembly of your town?  
 - crossed with the type of settlement -




Chart 29. Influencing change by voting in local elections in relation to the type of settlement

**Citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties think significantly more that they can influence change by voting in local elections** than those who are more inclined to opposition parties and those who are undecided.

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our state by voting in the local elections for the assembly of your town?  
 - crossed with political inclination -




Chart 30. Influencing change by voting in local elections in relation to political inclination

### Possibility of influencing change by joining a political party

How much citizens think they can influence change by joining a political party differs significantly in relation to age category they belong to ( $V = .108, p < .01$ ) and to their political inclination ( $V = .179, p < .001$ ). **As many as 65% of the oldest citizens think that they cannot influence change in the country at all by joining a political party**, which is significantly in comparison to middle-aged (58%) and to the youngest citizens (49%). On the other hand, **the youngest citizens were more likely to answer “yes and no” than the older age groups.**

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by joining a political party?  
- crossed with age -




Chart 31. Influencing change by joining a political party in relation to age

**Citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties think that they can influence change by joining a political party to a greater extent than those who are more inclined to opposition parties**, while the undecided think to the least extent that they can change something in this way.

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by joining a political party?  
- crossed with political inclination -




Chart 32. Influencing change by joining a political party in relation to political inclination

## Possibility to influence change by participating in demonstrations and protests

How much citizens think they can influence change by participating in demonstrations differs significantly in relation to the age category ( $V = .122, p < .001$ ), level of education ( $V = .179, p < .001$ ), region in which they live ( $V = .084, p < .05$ ) and political inclinations ( $V = .275, p < .001$ ).

Although, in general, a small number of citizens believe in the possibility of change through protest, **younger citizens are still more in favour of this idea**. A significantly larger number of the oldest citizens believe that they cannot influence change at all by participating in protests (71%).




Chart 33. Influencing change by participating in protests in relation to age

**The more educated citizens are, the more they think they can influence change by participating in demonstrations and protests.** Only 8% of citizens who have completed primary school at most think that they can influence change quite a lot or a lot in this way, while as many as 82% of them think that they cannot influence it at all. Those who have completed high school think to a somewhat greater extent that they can make quite or a lot of impact (17%). Citizens with a higher school or a university degree believe even more that they can influence change by participating in demonstrations or protests (27%).

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by participating in demonstrations and protests of citizens?  
- crossed with education -




Chart 34. Influencing change by participating in protests in relation to education

Citizens from Šumadija and Western Serbia point out to a greater extent that they cannot change things at all by participating in demonstrations (63%) than the citizens of Belgrade (50%) do. At the same time, **citizens from Belgrade and Southern and Eastern Serbia are significantly more likely to point out that they can be quite influential in this way than citizens from other parts of the country.**

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by participating in demonstrations and protests of citizens?  
- crossing with region -




Chart 35. Influencing change by participating in protests in relation to region

**As many as 78% of citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties do not think they can change things with demonstrations and protests,** while those who are more inclined to opposition parties mostly think that they can - 58% think that they can influence change quite or much in this way. The undecided mostly think that they

cannot influence change in this way at all, but they are practically between the previous two groups.

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by participating in demonstrations and protests of citizens?  
- crossing with political inclination -




Chart 36. Influencing change by participating in protests in relation to the region

### Possibility to influence change by drawing media attention

Citizens' perceptions of how much they can influence change by drawing media attention to their problems differ significantly in relation to the age category ( $V = .100$ ,  $p < .05$ ), level of education ( $V = .097$ ,  $p < .05$ ) and political inclination ( $V = .097$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

**A considerably smaller number of the youngest citizens think that they cannot influence changes at all by drawing the media attention to the problems of citizens (27%)** than the middle-aged (36%) or the oldest citizens (42%). Nevertheless, all three age groups equally think that quite or a lot can be influenced in this way. The difference is, therefore, reflected in the fact that the oldest citizens were much less likely than younger citizens to give the answer "yes and no".

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by drawing the media's attention to citizens' problems?  
 - crossed with age -




Chart 37. Influencing change by drawing media attention in relation to age

Citizens with incomplete or completed primary school also significantly more often pointed out that they do not agree at all with the fact that it is possible to change things in this way, in comparison to citizens who have completed high or higher school, or university. **The most educated citizens more often pointed out that drawing media attention can influence change quite a lot or a lot (38%) than citizens with completed high school or primary school (29%).**

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by drawing the media's attention to citizens' problems?  
 - crossed with education -




Chart 38. Influencing change by drawing media attention in relation to education

**Citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties are more likely to think they can change things by drawing media attention to citizens' problems than those who are closer to ruling parties and those who are undecided.**




Chart 39. Influencing change by drawing media attention in relation to political inclination

### **Possibility to influence change by connecting with non-governmental organisations**

How much citizens think they can influence change by connecting with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) differs significantly in relation to gender ( $V = .104$ ,  $p < .05$ ), age ( $V = .159$ ,  $p < .001$ ), educational level ( $V = .113$ ,  $p < .01$ ), type of settlement ( $V = .105$ ,  $p < .05$ ), as well as in relation to their political inclination ( $V = .158$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

The difference between genders is mostly reflected in the fact that women pointed out to a somewhat greater extent that changes can be greatly influenced by connecting with NGOs (8%) in comparison to men (3%). Nonetheless, **in this case, the conclusion that there is no significant difference is more justified.**

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by connecting with non-governmental organisations?  
- crossed with gender -




Chart 40. Influencing change by connecting with NGOs in relation to gender

**More than two thirds of citizens over the age of 65 point out that they cannot change things at all by connecting with non-governmental organisations,** which is significantly more than among middle-aged (51%) and the youngest respondents (39%). Only 11% of the oldest think that they can influence quite a lot or a lot in this way, while 16% of citizens between the ages of 35 and 64, or 19% of adult citizens under the age of 35, think the same.

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by connecting with non-governmental organisations?  
- crossed with age -




Chart 41. Influencing change by connecting with NGOs in relation to age

When it comes to education, slightly less than two thirds of citizens who have completed primary school at most think that they cannot influence change at all by connecting with non-governmental organisations, while 57% of those who completed high school and 43% of those who acquired a university degree think so. In general, **citizens in the**

group with the highest education are somewhat more optimistic about the possibility of influencing change in this way than citizens with a lower level of educational attainment.

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by connecting with non-governmental organisations?  
- crossed with education -




Chart 42. Influencing change by connecting with NGOs in relation to education

The urban population believes to a somewhat greater extent that they can influence change by connecting with NGOs compared to those living in rural areas. **However, the difference is extremely small, so it makes more sense to conclude that the difference is very mild in intensity.**

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by connecting with non-governmental organisations?  
- crossed with the type of settlement -




Chart 43. Influencing change by connecting with NGOs in relation to the type of settlement

**Citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties mostly think that they can influence change in the country by connecting with non-governmental organisations, while citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties think so the least. Undecided on this issue are between these two groups.**




Chart 44. Influencing change by connecting with NGOs in relation to political inclination

### **Possibility of influencing change by organising actions through the Internet and social networks**

The extent to which citizens think they can influence change by organising actions through the Internet and social networks differs significantly in relation to age category they belong to ( $V = .194, p < .001$ ), their educational level ( $V = .130, p < .001$ ) and their political inclination ( $V = .106, p < .01$ ).

**A significantly higher number of the oldest citizens think that they cannot at all influence change through the Internet and social networks (65%) in comparison to the middle-aged (42%) and the youngest respondents (27%).** Middle-aged citizens are also significantly more sceptical that things can change in this way compared to the youngest population.

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by organising actions through the Internet and social networks?  
- crossed with age -




Chart 45. Influencing change by organising actions through the Internet in relation to age

**Citizens who have completed primary school at most mainly point out that they cannot at all influence change in this way (61%),** much less than those who have completed high school (45%) or who have completed higher or university education. (36%). At the same time, the population with the lowest level of education points out to a somewhat greater extent that change can be influenced a lot in this way, while the more educated population think to a greater extent that change can be quite influenced.

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by organising actions through the Internet and social networks?  
- crossed with education -




Chart 46. Influencing change by organising actions through the Internet in relation to education

Citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties think least that they can influence change by organising actions through the Internet, while **citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties mostly think that they can influence change this way.**

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by organising actions through the Internet and social networks?  
 - crossed with political inclination -




Chart 47. Influencing change by organising actions through the Internet in relation to political inclination

### Possibility to influence change by contacting MPs

The extent to which citizens think they can influence change by contacting MPs differs significantly only in terms of their political inclination ( $V = ,172, p < ,01$ ).

As a matter of fact, citizens who are inclined to ruling parties think to a much greater extent that they can influence change in this way than those who are inclined the opposition or those who are not inclined to either. In addition, about **two-thirds of those inclined to opposition parties and those who are undecided think that they cannot influence change at all by contacting MPs**, while 45% of citizens who inclined to ruling parties think the same.

How much do you think you can influence the change of things in our country by contacting the MPs in the Assembly?  
 - crossed with political inclination -




Chart 48. Influencing change by contacting MPs in relation to political inclination

### Participation in initiatives

As many as two thirds of citizens (68%) have not participated in any action or initiative to solve the problem in the local community. There are more citizens who have participated in an action (20%) than those who have initiated an action (11%).

Did you initiate or actively participate in any action or initiative to solve a problem in your local community last year?



Chart 49. Participation in actions in the local community

There is a significant difference between genders in terms of initiating actions in the local community ( $V = .105, p < .01$ ). Citizens of different educational levels also differ when it comes to initiating actions in the local community ( $V = .131, p < .001$ ).

Although it should be noted that a small number of citizens initiate actions (only 11%), there are still slightly more men (14%) than women (8%) who do it.

Did you initiate or actively participate in any action or initiative to solve a problem in your local community last year?

- crossed with gender -




Chart 50. Participation in actions in the local community in relation to gender

**The most educated citizens mostly initiate and participate in initiatives.** Those who have completed high school run initiatives significantly more (10%) than those who have completed primary school (2%), but there is no difference between these two groups in terms of participation in initiatives.

Did you initiate or actively participate in any action or initiative to solve a problem in your local community?  
- crossed with education -




Chart 51. Participation in actions in the local community in relation to education

As a reason for not participating and not initiating an action, citizens most often stated **that they do not believe that something can be achieved with that (32%), and that they do not have time for that (29%)**. About 18% of citizens point out that they do not know how to do it, while 13% of citizens are not interested in such an engagement.

What is the main reason why you were not a participant or an initiator of the action?  
-% of those who did not participate in or initiate the action -




Chart 52. The main cause of non-participation

### 3. Political views

In this part of the research, we examined the attitudes of citizens about the political system of Serbia, as well as about certain foreign policy topics.

**Slightly less than a third of the population completely agrees with the statement that democracy is the best political system for our country (29%),** 18% of them mostly agree, while 16% do not agree at all. **38% of citizens completely agree with the statement that a strong leader and a “firm hand” are needed.** However, do not agree with that at all. In relation to the question of democracy, where as many as 22% are undecided, the attitude towards a strong leader is much more polarised among the population.

#### Political views




Chart 53. Attitude about democracy and a strong leader

#### Attitude about democracy

The extent to which citizens believe that democracy is the best political system for our country depends on age category they belong to ( $V = .147, p < .001$ ). Citizens over the age of 65 mostly or completely agree with this view (60%). Middle-aged respondents agree with this slightly less (53%), but significantly more than the youngest - **only 38% of adult citizens under the age of 35 agree that democracy is the best political system for our country.**

Despite all the difficulties, democracy is the best political system for our country  
- crossed with age -




Chart 54. Attitude about democracy in relation to age

In addition to age, agreement with this statement largely depends on the political inclination, i.e. on whether the citizens are more inclined to ruling parties, the opposition or neither ( $V = .158, p < .001$ ). In point of facts, those who are more inclined to the opposition are more in favour of democracy than those who are more inclined to ruling parties. However, **those who are not inclined to either are much less committed to democracy as a solution for Serbia's political system.**

Despite all the difficulties, democracy is the best political system for our country  
- crossed with political inclination -




Chart 55. Attitude about democracy in relation to political inclination

### Attitude about a strong leader

**Women are somewhat more inclined to a strong leader and “firm hand” in Serbia than men ( $V = .118, p < .01$ ).** More than one half of women either largely or completely agree with this statement (57%), compared to 49% of men.

At the moment, it is best for our country to have one strong leader that everyone would obey, because only a firm hand can lead us out of the crisis  
- crossed with gender -




Chart 56. Attitude about a strong leader in relation to gender

The extent to which citizens support a strong leader and a “firm hand” depends on age category they belong to ( $V = .152, p < .001$ ). Citizens over the age of 65 mostly or completely agree with this view (62%). The middle-aged and the youngest agree a little less - about one half of the citizens in both age groups.

At the moment, it is best for our country to have one strong leader that everyone would obey, because only a firm hand can lead us out of the crisis  
- crossing with age -




Chart 57. Attitude about a strong leader in relation to age

The preference of a strong leader differs significantly in relation to the level of education of citizens ( $V = .247, p < .001$ ). Almost one half of the citizens who have completed higher or university education do not agree with this statement at all, while 20% of those who finished high school and only 8% of those who completed only primary school do not agree at all. In other words, **less educated citizens largely agree with the view that it is best for our country to have a strong leader.**

At the moment, it is best for our country to have one strong leader that everyone would obey, because only a firm hand can lead us out of the crisis  
- crossing with education -




Chart 58. Attitude about a strong leader in relation to education

The difference also occurs in relation to the region ( $V = .097, p < .01$ ). The citizens of Belgrade and Southern and Eastern Serbia differ the most - **a much smaller number of Belgraders agree that we need a “firm hand” and a strong leader.**

At the moment, it is best for our country to have one strong leader that everyone would obey, because only a firm hand can lead us out of the crisis  
- crossed with the region -




Chart 59. Attitude about a strong leader in relation to the region

**Citizens from rural settlements agree to a much greater extent with the fact that Serbia needs a strong leader** ( $V = .191, p < .001$ ) than the population from urban settlements. About 50% of citizens from rural areas fully agree with this view, compared to 33% of those living in cities.

At the moment, it is best for our country to have a strong leader that everyone would obey, because only a firm hand can lead us out of the crisis  
- crossed with the type of settlement -




Chart 60. Attitude about a strong leader in relation to the type of settlement

The biggest difference in terms of support to a strong leader exists in relation to the political orientation of citizens ( $V = .355, p < .001$ ). **As many as two thirds of citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties completely agree that we need a strong leader and a “firm hand”, compared to only 12% of those who are more inclined to opposition parties, among whom slightly more than two thirds do not agree at all.** Those who are undecided are somewhere between these two groups.

At the moment, it is best for our country to have a strong leader that everyone would obey, because only a firm hand can lead us out of the crisis  
- crossed with political inclination-




Chart 61. Attitude about a strong leader in relation to political inclination

## Views of foreign policy

About one third of citizens would be happy both if Serbia joined the EU and if we gave this idea up and formed an alliance with Russia or China. When it comes to recognising Kosovo's independence, only 4% of citizens would be happy, while 68% would be worried. On the other hand, there are far fewer people who would be worried about joining the EU or forming an alliance with Russia or China.

How would you feel if the following occurred...




Chart 62. Views of foreign policy

## Views of accession to the European Union

Citizens who have graduated from higher school or university would be significantly happier to join the EU than less educated citizens ( $V = .122, p < .001$ ). Almost one half of the most educated citizens (45%) would be happy if this happened, compared to 30% of those who finished high school, or to 26% of those who have completed primary school at most.

How would you feel if Serbia joined the European Union?  
- crossed with education -




Chart 63. Views of accession to the European Union in relation to education

**The urban population would be significantly happier to join the European Union than citizens living in rural settlements ( $V = .107, p < .01$ ). There is no difference in relation to the type of settlement in terms of how indifferent the citizens would be.**




Chart 64. Views of accession to the European Union in relation to the type of settlement

Citizens' views of Serbia's accession to the EU significantly depends on their political inclination ( $V = .107, p < .01$ ). Citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties (53%) would be the happiest to join, much more than those who are more inclined to ruling parties (39%) or those who are undecided (31%). **The most indifferent are citizens who are not inclined either to ruling parties or to the opposition (49%).**




Chart 65. Views of accession to the European Union in relation to political inclination

### Views on the alliance with Russia or China

Men would be a little happier than women if Serbia gave up the EU path and formed an alliance with Russia or China ( $V = .123, p < .001$ ). On the other hand, women would be more indifferent than men if that happened.




Chart 66. Views of the alliance with Russia or China in relation to gender

When it comes to age ( $V = .109, p < .001$ ), the oldest respondents would be the happiest with the alliance with Russia or China, then the youngest, and only then the citizens who are between 35 and 64 years old. Among the middle-aged citizens, almost one half are indifferent to the hypothetical alliance with Russia or China.




Chart 67. Views of the alliance with Russia or China in relation to age

Feelings towards a potential alliance with Russia or China significantly depend on the education of citizens ( $V = .124, p < .001$ ). Those with **the least education (50%) would be the happiest with the alliance with Russia or China**, followed by those with a high school diploma (40%), whereas those with a higher school or university degree would be the least happy (32%).




Chart 68. Views of the alliance with Russia or China in relation to education

**Citizens living in rural parts of Serbia ( $V = .109, p < .01$ ) would be happier about giving up the EU path and forming an alliance with Russia or China** than those living in urban areas. There are more people in cities who would be worried and who would be indifferent.




Chart 69. Views of the alliance with Russia or China in relation to the type of settlement

Citizens' views of giving up the EU path and forming an alliance with Russia or China also depends on political inclination ( $V = .225, p < .001$ ). **Citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties would be the happiest (56%),** and those who are more inclined to opposition parties would be the least happy (18%).




Chart 70. Views of the alliance with Russia or China in relation to political inclination

### Views of the recognition of Kosovo's independence

**Citizens over the age of 65 would be more worried if Serbia recognised Kosovo's independence than younger citizens ( $V = .077, p < .05$ ).** As many as 81% of citizens from the oldest age group would be worried compared to about 70% from the middle-aged group and the youngest group. **In all three groups, the number of citizens who would be happy is negligible.**




Chart 71. Views of the recognition of Kosovo's independence in relation to age

The extent to which citizens would be worried if Kosovo's independence were recognised depends significantly on their political inclination ( $V = .136, p < .001$ ). **Citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties would be the most worried (83%)** and significantly more than those who are undecided (68%), while citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties (56%) would be the least worried. **Citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties are most likely to be indifferent (40%).**




Chart 72. Views of the recognition of Kosovo's independence in relation to political inclination

#### 4. Satisfaction with the work of the Government and the Assembly

In this part, the citizens' satisfaction with the work of the Government of Serbia in the period from 2017-2020 will be presented, as well as the work of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia in the period from 2016-2020. Specific attitudes of citizens regarding the work of the Assembly and MPs will be presented as well.

##### Satisfaction with the work of the Government

Slightly less than one third of citizens (30%) are not at all satisfied with the work of the Government of Serbia, while 11% of citizens are mostly dissatisfied. On the other hand, 18% of citizens pointed out that they are mostly satisfied, and there are as many who are completely satisfied. **In general, citizens are somewhat more dissatisfied with the work of the Government (41%) than they are satisfied (36%).**

Citizens over the age of 65 are the most satisfied with the work of the Government, the least educated are those who are more inclined to ruling parties, and there is somewhat greater satisfaction among women, citizens from rural areas and citizens living in Southern and Eastern Serbia.

How satisfied are you with the work of the previous Government of Serbia, formed in 2017, headed by Prime Minister Ana Brnabić?




Chart 73. Satisfaction with the work of the Government of Serbia

**Men are less satisfied with the work of the Government of Serbia than women** ( $V = .103, p < .05$ ). One third of men (34%) are not satisfied with the work of the Government at all, compared to 28% of women. Also, 22% of women pointed out that they were completely satisfied with the work of the Government, compared to 15% of men.

How satisfied are you with the work of the previous Government of Serbia, formed in 2017, headed by Prime Minister Ana Brnabić?  
- crossed with gender -




Chart 74. Satisfaction with the work of the Government of Serbia in relation to gender

**The oldest citizens are significantly more satisfied with the work of the Government than the middle-aged and youngest citizens ( $V = .166, p < .001$ ).** As many as 54% of citizens over the age of 65 are generally or completely satisfied with the work of the Government, compared to 33% of middle-aged and 32% of the youngest respondents.

How satisfied are you with the work of the previous Government of Serbia, formed in 2017, headed by Prime Minister Ana Brnabić?  
- crossed with age -




Chart 75. Satisfaction with the work of the Government of Serbia in relation to age

The extent to which citizens are satisfied with the work of the Government of Serbia differs greatly depending on the level of education ( $V = .218, p < .001$ ). **Citizens with higher or university education are the least satisfied with the work of the Government - only 10% of them said they were completely satisfied.** On the other hand, 19% of citizens who have completed high school and as many as 44% of citizens who have completed primary school at most expressed their complete satisfaction. Among citizens with the highest education, 43% are not satisfied at all, which is approximately twice as many as among less educated citizens.




Chart 76. Satisfaction with the work of the Government of Serbia in relation to education

Citizens' satisfaction with the work of the Government of Serbia differs significantly depending on the region in which they live ( $V = .095, p < .05$ ). More specifically, **more citizens from Southern and Eastern Serbia point out that they are satisfied with the Government** than citizens living in other regions of the country.




Chart 77. Satisfaction with the work of the Government of Serbia in relation to region

**The population from rural settlements is significantly more satisfied with the work of the Government than the citizens living in urban areas** ( $V = .113, p < .05$ ). Namely, one third of citizens (34%) living in cities are either mostly or completely satisfied with the work of the Government, compared to 43% of those living in rural areas.




Chart 78. Satisfaction with the work of the Government of Serbia in relation to the type of settlement

The extent to which citizens are satisfied with the work of the Government of Serbia differs significantly in relation to their political inclination ( $V = .474, p < .001$ ). **Citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties are mostly satisfied with the work of the Government - as many as 80% of them are either mostly or completely satisfied.** On the other hand, only 3% of citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties point out that they are mostly satisfied, while no one said that they are completely satisfied. Among them, as many as 78% of citizens are completely dissatisfied with the work of the Government. **Citizens who are not inclined to either side are more dissatisfied than they are satisfied.** More specifically, **57% of them are generally or mostly dissatisfied, while only 19% are mostly or completely satisfied.**




Chart 79. Satisfaction with the work of the Government of Serbia in relation to political inclination

### Satisfaction with the work of the National Assembly

**The largest number of citizens are not at all satisfied with the previous convocation of the Serbian Assembly - almost one third (31%).** About 24% of citizens are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, while 14% of citizens are completely satisfied with the work of the Assembly, and 16% are mostly satisfied. Citizens over the age of 65 are significantly more satisfied with the work of the Assembly, those who have completed primary school at most, who live in rural areas, as well as citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties.




Chart 80. Satisfaction with the work of the National Assembly of Serbia

**The oldest citizens are significantly more satisfied with the work of the Assembly than the middle-aged and the youngest citizens ( $V = .159, p < .001$ ).** Slightly less than one half of citizens over the age of 65 (46%) are generally or completely satisfied with the work of the Assembly, compared to 27% of middle-aged and 24% of the youngest. In all three age groups, there is approximately the same number of those who are not satisfied at all (about one third of the citizens). Nevertheless, in the oldest age group, there are significantly fewer respondents who are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.




Chart 81. Satisfaction with the work of the National Assembly of Serbia in relation to age

Citizens' satisfaction with the work of the National Assembly significantly depends on the level of their education ( $V = .224, p < .001$ ). Satisfaction with the work of the Assembly of Serbia declines with the increase in education. More specifically, the most educated citizens are the least satisfied with the work of the Assembly, while those with completed primary school at most are the most satisfied.




Chart 82. Satisfaction with the work of the National Assembly of Serbia in relation to education

The population from rural settlements is significantly more satisfied with the work of the Assembly than the respondents living in urban settlements ( $V = .167, p < .001$ ). Slightly more than one third of rural citizens are mostly or completely satisfied (37%), which is ten percent more than those living in cities.




Chart 83. Satisfaction with the work of the National Assembly of Serbia in relation to education

Citizens' satisfaction with the work of the Assembly significantly depends on their political inclination ( $V = .467, p < .001$ ). Citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties are mostly satisfied with the work of the Assembly. On the other hand, **only 3% of citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties point out that they are mostly satisfied, while no one said that they are completely satisfied.** Among them, as many as 80% of citizens are completely dissatisfied with the work of the Assembly. **Those who are not inclined to either side are more dissatisfied than they are satisfied. More specifically, 59% of them are generally or mostly dissatisfied, while only 14% are mostly or completely satisfied.**




Chart 84. Satisfaction with the work of the National Assembly of Serbia in relation to political

### Assessment of the work of the Assembly and MPs

When it comes to specific activities of the Assembly and MPs, the results of the research show that citizens do not assess them particularly favourably. **One third of citizens do not agree at all with the statement that the Assembly of Serbia performs an efficient oversight over the work of the Government (34%),** and there is approximately the same number of those who do not agree at all with the statement that MPs are available to citizens (37%). In the latter case, only 10% of citizens fully agree with the given statement about the availability of MPs. **As many as one half of the citizens (53%) believe that the MPs in the Assembly care more about the interests of their political parties than about the interests of the citizens.** In addition, 58% of citizens generally or completely agree with the statement that MPs ruin the reputation of the Assembly by their behaviour.

#### Views of the work of the National Assembly




Chart 85. Assessment of the Work of the Assembly and MPs

### Efficiency in the oversight over the Government

Women agree to a somewhat greater extent with the statement that the Assembly performs an efficient oversight over the work of the Government than men ( $V = .102, p < .05$ ). The difference is only a few per cents, except when it comes to the option “I do not agree at all” which was chosen by ten percent more men.

The National Assembly of Serbia efficiently oversees the work of the Government and makes sure that the Government pursues an accountable policy for the benefit of all citizens  
- crossed with gender -




Chart 86. Assessing the efficiency of the oversight over the Government in relation to gender

The oldest citizens much more often agree with the statement that the Assembly efficiently oversees the work of the Government than middle-aged and younger citizens ( $V = .172, p < .001$ ). The oldest respondents who completely agree with this are twice as numerous as the middle-aged and three times more numerous than the youngest respondents.

The National Assembly of Serbia efficiently oversees the work of the Government and makes sure that the Government pursues an accountable policy for the benefit of all citizens  
- crossing with age -




Chart 87. Assessing the efficiency of the oversight over the Government in relation to age

**More educated citizens to a much lesser extent think that the Assembly efficiently oversees the work of the Government** ( $V = .218, p < .001$ ). One half of the citizens who completed higher school or university do not agree with this attitude at all, compared to 30% of those with high school and only 12% of those who completed primary school at most. About 57% of the least educated citizens generally or completely agree with this statement.

The National Assembly of Serbia efficiently oversees the work of the Government and makes sure that the Government pursues an accountable policy for the benefit of all citizens  
- crossed with education -




Chart 88. Assessing the efficiency of the oversight over the Government in relation to education

**Citizens living in Southern and Eastern Serbia agree more with the statement that the Assembly efficiently oversees the work of the Government than citizens from other regions of Serbia** ( $V = .090, p < .05$ ). Slightly less than one half of the citizens (45%) from Southern and Eastern Serbia generally or completely agree with this statement, compared to 27-32% of citizens from other regions.

The National Assembly of Serbia efficiently oversees the work of the Government and makes sure that the Government pursues an accountable policy for the benefit of all citizens  
- crossed with region -




Chart 89. Assessing the efficiency of the oversight over the Government in relation to region

The population from rural areas thinks that the Assembly efficiently oversees the work of the Government to a greater extent than the respondents who live in cities ( $V = .132, p < .01$ ). The biggest difference is reflected in the extreme responses. About one quarter (24%) of citizens from rural areas completely agree with this statement, compared to 15% of respondents from urban areas. At the same time, 39% of those living in cities do not agree with it at all, compared to 30% of citizens from rural areas.




Chart 90. Assessing the efficiency of the oversight over the Government in relation to the type of settlement

There is a significant difference in agreement with the statement that the Assembly efficiently oversees the work of the Government in relation to whether citizens are more inclined to ruling parties, to the opposition or are undecided ( $V = .393, p < .001$ ). **Citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties mostly agree with this statement - 39% of them completely agree.** Among citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties, only 3% completely agree, and as many as 75% completely disagree. **Citizens who are undecided are somewhere between these two polarised groups**, but are closer to opposition-minded citizens because they mostly disagree with the Assembly efficiently overseeing the Government - 46% of them completely disagree.

The National Assembly of Serbia efficiently oversees the work of the Government and makes sure that the Government pursues an accountable policy for the benefit of all citizens  
 - crossed with political inclination -




Chart 91. Assessing the efficiency of the oversight over the Government in relation to political inclination

### Availability of MPs

Citizens over the age of 65 to a somewhat greater extent believe that MPs in the Assembly are available to citizens who want to contact them than younger citizens ( $V = .098, p < .05$ ). 29% of the oldest citizens either largely or completely agree with the statement that MPs are available.

Members of the Serbian Parliament are available to citizens who want to contact them  
 - crossed with age -




Chart 92. Assessment of the availability of MPs in relation to age

**More educated citizens to a lesser extent think that MPs are available to citizens** ( $V = .187, p < .001$ ). Slightly more than one half of citizens who have completed higher school or university completely disagree with this statement, compared to 39% of those who have completed high school and to 22% of those who have completed primary school at most. Among the citizens who have completed primary school at most, almost one half (46%) generally or completely agree that MPs are available to citizens.




Chart 93. Assessment of the availability of MPs in relation to education

**Citizens living in Southern and Eastern Serbia agree somewhat more with the statement that MPs are available to citizens who want to contact them than respondents from other regions of Serbia** ( $V = .093, p < .05$ ). Residents of Belgrade agree with this attitude the least - as many as 51% pointed out that they do not agree at all.




Chart 94. Assessment of the availability of MPs in relation to region

The population from rural settlements thinks that MPs are accessible to citizens more than those who live in urban areas ( $V = .151, p < .001$ ). 48% of those living in cities do not agree at all with the statement that MPs are available, while 35% of respondents from rural settlements gave that answer.




Chart 95. Assessment of the availability of MPs in relation to the type of settlement

There is a significant difference in agreement with the statement that MPs are available to citizens in relation to whether citizens are more inclined to ruling parties, opposition or are undecided ( $V = .267, p < .001$ ). Citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties largely agree with this statement - 42% of them mostly or completely agree. Among citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties, only 1% completely agree, while 67% completely disagree. **Citizens who are undecided are somewhere between these two polarised groups, but are closer to opposition-minded citizens.**




Chart 96. Assessment of the availability of MPs in relation to political inclination

## MPs' care about citizens' interests

**More educated citizens agree more with the statement that the MPs care more about the interest of their parties than about the citizens' (V = .152, p < .001).** Among citizens with a higher school or university degree, 65% completely agree with this view, compared to 53% of those with a high school diploma and 35% of citizens who have completed primary school at most.




Chart 97. Assessment of MPs' care about citizens' interests in relation to education

The citizens' agreement with the statement that the MPs care more about their parties' interest than the citizens' interest significantly depends on their political inclination (V = .280, p < .001). **As many as 90% of citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties think that MPs care more about the parties' interest than about the citizens' interest.** On the other hand, 64% of the undecided think the same, which is twice as many in comparison to citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties (32%).




Chart 98. Assessment of MPs' care about citizens' interests in relation to political inclination

## Tarnishing the reputation of the Assembly

Citizens between the ages of 35 and 64 are more likely to believe that MPs are ruining the reputation of the Assembly by their behaviour than those who are under 35 or over 65 ( $V = .098, p < .05$ ). As many as half of middle-aged citizens (35-64) completely agree with this statement, compared to 41% of the youngest (18-34) and 38% of the oldest respondents (65+).




Chart 99. Assessment of tarnishing the reputation of the Assembly in relation to age

Citizens who have completed higher or university education to a much greater extent think that MPs ruin the reputation of the Assembly by their behaviour than citizens of lower education level ( $V = .161, p < .001$ ). This is the assessment given by as many as 57% of the most educated, compared to 41% of citizens who have completed high school, and to 26% of citizens who have only completed primary school. The biggest difference exists between those with the highest level of education and those with primary school.




Chart 100. Assessment of tarnishing the reputation of the Assembly in relation to education

**Respondents from urban areas agree somewhat more with the statement that MPs ruin the reputation of the Assembly by their behaviour than those living in rural areas ( $V = .100, p < .05$ ). Nonetheless, this difference is extremely small.**




Chart 101. Assessment of tarnishing the reputation of the Assembly in relation to the type of settlement

**Citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties, then undecided, and then those who are inclined to ruling parties ( $V = .225, p < .001$ ) believe that MPs are ruining the reputation of the Assembly by their behaviour.** As many as 82% of citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties completely agree that the MPs are ruining the reputation of the Assembly by their behaviour, while 27% of citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties, i.e. one half of undecided citizens, think the same. Once again, those who are not inclined to either ruling parties or opposition parties are closer to opposition-minded citizens.




Chart 102. Assessment of tarnishing the reputation of the Assembly in relation to political inclination

## 5. Elections

In this chapter, we examined the intention of the citizens to vote in the elections. Citizens who intend to vote were asked what their motivation to go to the polls was, while those who did not plan to vote stated the reason why.

### Intention to vote in the elections

If the parliamentary elections were to be held on the week in which the respondents were interviewed, slightly more than one half of the citizens would certainly vote, 12% would probably vote, while 22% of the citizens would certainly not vote. 6% of respondents are undecided.

If parliamentary elections were held this week, would you vote in those elections?




Chart 103. Intention to vote in the elections

**Citizens over the age of 65 were significantly more likely to point out that they would certainly vote in elections than the younger population ( $V = .131, p < .001$ ). Also, middle-aged citizens (35-54) pointed out to a somewhat greater extent that they would certainly vote in comparison to the youngest (18-34), who are more often than middle-aged citizens indicated that they would probably vote.**




Chart 104. Intention to vote in the elections in relation to age

Citizens from rural settlements pointed out somewhat more often that they would probably vote, i.e., they said to a lesser extent that they would certainly not vote than the population from urban areas ( $V = .114, p < .05$ ). The difference between these two groups, however, is very small.




Chart 105. Intention to vote in the elections in relation to the type of settlement

Citizens' readiness to vote in the elections significantly depends on their political inclinations ( $V = .267, p < .001$ ). **As many as 81% of citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties would certainly go to the polls**, compared to one half of those who are more inclined to opposition parties (48%), or to 42% of those who are inclined to neither. **Although there are somewhat more undecided than opposition-minded citizens who would certainly not go to the polls, there is not much difference between the two groups.**

If there were parliamentary elections this week, would you vote in those elections?

- crossed with political inclination -




Chart 106. Intention to vote in the elections in relation to political inclination

## Motive for voting in elections

In order to determine the main motive of the citizens who intend to go to the polls, the respondents were offered three answers, out of which they had to choose one. **As the most common reason for voting in the elections, citizens state the feeling that it is their duty (44%),** then the desire to influence the policy that will be implemented in Serbia (32%), while the rarest reason is to give support to a party they are close to and to its leader (16%).

In general, what is your motive for voting in the elections?  
- % of those who said they would vote -




Chart 107. Motive for voting in the elections

The motive for voting in the elections depends on the age group that the citizens belong to ( $V = .100, p < .05$ ). **This difference is reflected in the fact that the oldest citizens more often pointed out the reason for giving support to a party that is close to them and to the leader of that party than younger citizens.**

What is your motive for voting in the elections?  
- crossed with age -




Chart 108. Motive for voting in the elections in relation to age

Those who have completed primary school are less likely to quote the desire to influence the policy to be implemented, and more often to provide support to the party and the leader than those who have completed high school or those with the highest level of education ( $V = .177, p < .001$ ). Those who completed only primary school or at most high school reported a much greater sense of civic duty than the most educated citizens, who mostly go to the polls because they want to influence the policy that will be implemented in Serbia.

What is your motive for voting in the elections?  
- crossed with education -




Chart 109. Motive for voting in elections in relation to education

Citizens living in rural areas quoted as a motive the desire to influence the policy that will be implemented in Serbia to a lesser extent, and more often the support that would like to give to the party and the leader, compared to the respondents from urban areas. ( $V = .138, p < .01$ ).

What is your motive for voting in the elections?  
- crossed with type of settlement -




Chart 110. Motive for voting in elections in relation to the type of settlement

The motives for voting in the elections differ significantly in relation to the political inclination of the citizens ( $V = .273, p < .001$ ). **Citizens who pointed out that they would vote in the elections, and who are more inclined to ruling parties, most often quote civic duty as the reason (39%),** followed by giving support to the party and to the leader (31%). On the other hand, **as many as half of the citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties state their desire to influence the policy that will be implemented in Serbia (51%),** while half of those who are undecided state their civic duty as the main motive. (49%).




Chart 111. Motive for voting in elections in relation to political inclination

### Reasons not to vote in the elections

**As the most common reason for not going to the polls, citizens state that they do not trust that any party will fulfil its pre-election promises (27%).** Between 12 and 16% of citizens quoted reasons such as thinking that their vote would not change anything, that there was no political option they agreed with, that electoral conditions were not the same for all participants, that they were not interested in politics at all or had another reason. All these answers were given in advance.

What is the main reason for not going to the polls?  
 -% of those who answered they would not vote -




Chart 112. Reason not to vote

The reasons given by citizens who do not want to vote are significantly different in relation to age ( $V = .198, p < .05$ ). **The youngest (18-34) stated more than others that they were not interested in politics at all**, while the middle-aged (35-64) stated more than other age groups that there was no political option with which they agreed.

What is the main reason why you would not go to the polls?  
 - crossed with age -




Chart 113. Reason not to vote in relation to age

The main reason for not going to the polls also differs in relation to education ( $V = .262$ ,  $p < .001$ ). **Citizens who have only completed primary school are more likely to say that they are not interested in politics at all than those with a higher level of education.** In addition, it should be noted that **those with higher or university education are much more likely than less educated respondents to point out that there is no political option with which they agree.**

What is the main reason why you would not go to the polls?  
- crossed with education -




Chart 114. Reason not to vote in relation to education

The main reason for not going to the polls also depends on the political inclination of the citizens ( $V = .382$ ,  $p < .001$ ). **The undecided mostly do not vote because they do not trust that any party will fulfil its pre-election promises and because there is no party that they agree with,** while those who are more inclined to opposition parties mostly do not vote because election conditions are not equal for all participants. Citizens who are more inclined to ruling party mostly vote for reasons not listed, but they do not vote much more than other groups because they think their vote will not change anything.

What is the main reason why you would not go to the polls?  
 - crossed with political inclination -




Chart 115. Reason not to vote in relation to political inclination

## 6. Media

In the last part of the research, citizens answered questions about how they are informed about socio-political topics. Citizens could give multiple answers to all questions related to sources of information, i.e. mark multiple options. Furthermore, respondents rated the quality and freedom of the media.

**In order to be informed, citizens most often use television and radio** - two thirds indicated these options. One half of the respondents use internet portals (48%), a slightly smaller percentage use social networks (43%) or get information through conversations with relatives (42%), **while the smallest number of citizens read newspapers for information (26%).**

What are your main sources of information on political and social issues?




Chart 116. Main sources of information

One quarter of Serbian citizens watch RTS for information, about 15% watch Pink TV, 11% Prva, 10% N1, while a significantly smaller number of people watch other television stations.

Which TV station do you most often use to get informed?  
 -% of responses from the population -




Chart 117. TV stations as sources of information

The largest number of citizens (6%) stated that they visit the Blic internet portal for information, followed by N1 (5%) and Kurir (3%). All other portals are visited by 2% or less percent for information purposes.

Which internet portal do you most often use to get informed?  
 -% of responses from the population -




Chart 118. Internet portals as sources of information

When it comes to daily newspapers, citizens mostly read Blic, Večernje novosti and Informer - 5% of citizens read these newspapers to get information. Kurir is read by 4% of citizens, Politika and Danas by 3%, while other newspapers are read by 2% or less percent.

Which daily newspapers and weeklies do you most often read?  
- % of responses from the population -




Chart 119. Dailies and weeklies as sources of information

### Assessment of media quality and freedom

Slightly less than one half of citizens believe that the media in Serbia are under significant political pressure (46%). One quarter (26%) believe that there are occasional political pressures that do not jeopardise the freedom of the media, while the smallest number of citizens (21%) think that the media in Serbia are free and independent of political influences.

How do you generally assess the freedom of the media and the quality of public information? Which of the following opinions is closest to yours?




Chart 120. Assessment of media quality and freedom

**Men are more likely to think that the media are under significant pressure than women** ( $V = .120, p < .01$ ). As a matter of fact, 56% of men think so compared to 44% of women. At the same time, more women think that there are occasional pressures that do not threaten media freedom (32%) compared to men (24%).




Chart 121. Assessment of media quality and freedom in relation to gender

The assessment of media freedom also depends on age ( $V = .110, p < .001$ ). **The oldest citizens think to a much greater extent that the media are free and independent of political influences than the younger citizens.** Moreover, 57% of the youngest think that the media are under significant political pressure, as opposed to 51% of middle-aged and 38% of the oldest respondents.




Chart 122. Assessment of media quality and freedom in relation to age

The assessment of media freedom also differs in relation to education ( $V = .204, p < .001$ ). **As many as two thirds of citizens with higher or university education think that the media are under significant political pressure.** To a lesser extent, those who have completed high school at most (42%) think so, while the smallest number those who think so are among citizens who completed only primary school (24%).

How do you generally assess the freedom of the media and the quality of public information?  
- crossed with education -




Chart 123. Assessment of media quality and freedom in relation to education

There are significant differences in the assessment of media freedom in relation to political inclination ( $V = .330, p < .001$ ). **Citizens who are more inclined to opposition parties mostly think that the media are under significant political pressure (86%), while only 20% of citizens who are more inclined to ruling parties think so.** The politically undecided generally think that the media are under significant pressure - as many as 61% of them - while 14% believe that the media are free and independent.

How do you generally assess the freedom of the media and the quality of public information?  
- crossed with political inclination -




Chart 124. Assessment of media quality and freedom in relation to political inclination



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