{"id":45152,"date":"2026-08-21T14:07:50","date_gmt":"2026-08-21T12:07:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/crta.rs\/?p=45152"},"modified":"2026-08-21T14:07:50","modified_gmt":"2026-08-21T12:07:50","slug":"analysis-of-electoral-law-amendments","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/crta.rs\/en\/analysis-of-electoral-law-amendments\/","title":{"rendered":"Analysis of Electoral Law Amendments"},"content":{"rendered":"

On April 21, 2026, proposals to amend four laws entered parliamentary procedure<\/b>: the Law on the Election of Members of Parliament, the Law on Local Elections, the Law on the Constitutional Court, and the Law on the Election of the President of the Republic. The process of amending electoral laws was initiated on February 2, 2026, despite the <\/span>Reform Agenda<\/span><\/a> having stipulated that amendments to key laws in this area were to be completed by the end of 2025.<\/span><\/p>\n

The aforementioned laws <\/span>were adopted on 20 May 2026<\/b>, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia on 22 May 2026, and entered into force on 31 May 2026, except for the provisions relating to mandatory training for members of election administration bodies, which shall enter into force on 1 January 2028.<\/span><\/p>\n

The preparation process is accompanied by serious procedural and institutional shortcomings, including a lack of clarity regarding who drafted the initial proposal and the criteria used to formulate it. The proposals were forwarded to an inactive Working Group, whose members from civil society and the opposition had previously withdrawn due to a lack of transparency and procedural violations, repeating the same patterns. Following multiple revisions based on ODIHR opinions, the proposals were formally submitted to parliamentary procedure.<\/span><\/p>\n

Although the amendments are formally presented as alignment with ODIHR and Council of Europe recommendations, <\/span>their scope and content indicate a selective approach<\/b>. Within the four laws under amendment, key provisions relating to the prevention of electoral abuses and electoral engineering remain unchanged. The adopted measures largely consist of partial and technical amendments, while recommendations addressing the structural deficiencies of the electoral process are, for the most part, being overlooked. .<\/span><\/p>\n

Against this backdrop, three of the adopted measures are particularly noteworthy due to the risks they pose in light of the current socio-political context in Serbia.\u00a0 Although these solutions are grounded in comparatively accepted democratic practices, <\/span>their application under existing institutional conditions may produce the opposite effects – from additional abuses in the electoral process to a further erosion of trust in the judiciary<\/b>.<\/span><\/p>\n

First<\/b>, the removal of the \u2018one voter, one declaration of support\u2019 restriction for electoral lists, viewed in the context of long-standing and documented abuses of support declarations in previous electoral cycles, carries a significant risk of further electoral engineering and additional erosion of the integrity of the electoral process. Such an amendment may facilitate the nomination of so-called proxy lists and further encourage manipulative practices. Nevertheless, despite these negative implications in the domestic context, in comparative practice the removal of this restriction is generally regarded as a measure that can contribute to strengthening political pluralism – however, under existing circumstances in Serbia, such a solution can hardly be applied in a manner that would achieve these positive effects.<\/span><\/p>\n

Second<\/b>, the solution allowing a <\/span>group of citizens to run as a national minority list<\/b> creates additional scope for manipulation. Given that national minority lists are subject to more favorable conditions for nomination and obtaining mandates (fewer support signatures required and a lower natural threshold), this amendment may lead to an artificial increase in the number of electoral lists and affect the distribution of mandates in a way that does not reflect authentic political representation of minority communities.<\/span><\/p>\n

Third<\/b>, the introduction of <\/span>urgency in proceedings before the Constitutional Court in electoral disputes <\/b>represents a normatively justified solution. However, its practical effectiveness remains questionable in light of the Court’s longstanding operational problems, including inefficiency and the perception of its <\/span>institutional bias<\/span><\/a>, particularly given recent changes in the composition of judges.<\/span><\/p>\n

Additionally, certain solutions that CRTA assessed positively – such as specifying the body to which complaints in the electoral process should be submitted and more clearly defining deadlines for challenging decisions on electoral lists – although envisaged in the initial phase, <\/span>did not ultimately enter parliamentary procedure.<\/b><\/p>\n

Overview of the amendments<\/b><\/p>\n

The proposals to amend the Law on the Election of Members of Parliament, the Law on Local Elections, the Law on the Constitutional Court, and the Law on the Election of the President of the Republic entered parliamentary procedure on April 21, 2026. ODIHR issued its opinion on these amendments on two occasions, based on which the proposals were further revised. They were adopted in the following form, addressing the following issues:<\/span><\/p>\n